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ABSTRACT
The thesis consists of three chapters.
In Chapter one (with professor Nicholas Yannelis), we introduce the idea of
implementation under ambiguity. In particular, we study maximin efficient
notions of an ambiguous asymmetric information economy (i.e., economies
where agents’ preferences are maximin). The interest on the maximin effi-
cient notions lies in the fact that they are always incentive compatible (de
Castro-Yannelis [9]), a result which is false with Bayesian preferences. A non-
cooperative notion called maximin equilibrium is introduced which provides a
noncooperative foundation for individually rational and maximin efficient no-
tions, for example, maximin core and maximin value allocation. Specifically,
we show that given any arbitrary individually rational and ex-ante max-
imin efficient allocation, there is a direct revelation mechanism that yields
the efficient allocation as its unique maximin equilibrium outcome. Thus,
an incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient outcome can be
reached by means of noncooperative behavior under ambiguity.
In Chapter two, we provide a counterexample to the ex-ante efficiency of
the maximin rational expectations equilibrium. In particular, we show that
a maximin rational expectations equilibrium allocation may not be ex-ante
maximin efficient, and therefore it may not be in the maximin core. Another
consequence is that the implementation result of Chapter one cannot be
applied to the maximin rational expectations equilibrium.
ii
Finally, in Chapter three, we show that each maximin rational expecta-
tions equilibrium allocation is maximin Nash incentive compatible. Also, we
characterize the conditions, under which each maximin rational expectations
equilibrium is implementable as a maximin equilibrium. These findings con-
tribute to the desirability of the maximin rational expectations equilibrium
notion.
iii
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CHAPTER 1
IMPLEMENTATION UNDER AMBIGUITY
1.1 Introduction
We go beyond the Bayesian (standard) asymmetric information economy. In
particular, we study an ambiguous asymmetric information economy, i.e., an
economy consisting of a finite set of states of nature, a finite set of agents,
each of whom is characterized by an information partition, a (possibly incom-
plete1) private prior over the states of nature, a random initial endowment
and an ex post utility function. An ambiguous asymmetric information econ-
omy differs from the Bayesian one, in that we do not require agents to be
able to form a prior probability on every state of nature, nor do we require
the agents’ priors to be common knowledge. Furthermore, the agents evalu-
ate (random) allocations, hereafter allocations, with the help of the maximin
expected utility (see Gilboa and Schmeidler [14]).
In such an ambiguous asymmetric information economy, the notions max-
imin core and maximin value allocation are all individually rational and
ex-ante maximin efficient. The interest of these notions arises from the fact
that with maximin preferences, any efficient allocation is incentive compati-
1It will be made clear in the definition of an ambiguous asymmetric information econ-
omy, that an agent’s private prior is defined on the algebra generated by his information
partition. Therefore, had he observed a non singleton event in his information partition,
he does not know the probability of each of the states within the event, that is, he faces
ambiguity. As for where the ambiguity comes from, we refer interested readers to Ellsberg
[13] and Riedel and Sass [32].
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ble (de Castro-Yannelis [9]). In other words, maximin preferences solve the
conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency. Recall that in the
standard expected utility (Bayesian) framework, an efficient allocation may
not be incentive compatible as it was shown by Holmstro¨m-Myerson [20].2
We will show by means of an example that these individually rational and
ex-ante maximin efficient notions are different than the rational expectations
equilibrium (Radner [29]) or Walrasian expectations equilibrium (Radner
[28], [30]) or private core (Yannelis [35]). In particular, we illustrate that
these maximin notions not only exist in a situation that the Walrasian ex-
pectations equilibrium fails to exist, but also achieve higher efficiency than
all the Bayesian concepts.
But, could one provide a noncooperative foundation for these maximin
notions in terms of some game theoretic solution concept? In other words,
can individually rational and ex-ante maximin efficient allocations be reached
by means of noncooperative behavior? What would be the appropriate game
theoretic solution concept?
In view of the ambiguous asymmetric information economy, one should
not expect to employ any Bayesian Nash type equilibrium notion. To this
end, we introduce the idea of a maximin equilibrium. Roughly speaking, in
a maximin equilibrium, each agent maximizes his payoff lowest bound, that
is, each agent simply maximizes the payoff that takes into account the worst
actions of all the other agents against him and also the worst state that can
occur.
The main result of the chapter is that given any arbitrary individually
2Also, Ledyard [23] showed that a core selecting mechanism may not be individually
incentive compatible in a complete information setting. Furthermore, he [24] showed that
the introduction of incomplete information in the Bayesian sense may fail to create incen-
tive compatibility, if a mechanism is not incentive compatible under complete information.
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rational and ex-ante maximin efficient allocation, there is a direct revela-
tion mechanism that yields the allocation as its unique maximin equilibrium
outcome, i.e., each individually rational and ex-ante maximin efficient allo-
cation is implementable as a maximin equilibrium. A corollary of the result
is that each maximin core allocation and each maximin value allocation is
implementable as a maximin equilibrium. Therefore, incentive compatible,
individually rational and efficient outcomes can be reached by means of non-
cooperative behavior under ambiguity.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 defines an ambiguous
asymmetric information economy. Section 1.3 introduces the individually
rational and ex-ante maximin efficient notions. In Section 1.4, we introduce
the direct revelation mechanisms, the maximin equilibrium, and present the
main result of the chapter. Finally, we conclude in Section 1.5. Appendix
contains proofs.
1.2 Ambiguous asymmetric information economy
Let Ω denote a finite set of states of nature, ω ∈ Ω a state of nature, R`+ the
` good commodity space, and I the set of N agents, i.e., I = {1, · · · , N}.
An ambiguous asymmetric information economy E is a set
E = {Ω; (Fi, µi, ei, ui) : i ∈ I}
where for each i ∈ I,
1. Fi is a partition of Ω. Let EFii ∈ Fi denote an event, and ω ∈ EFii a
state in the event. Then, in the interim, if the state ω occurs, agent i
only knows that the event EFii has occurred. Also, we impose the stan-
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dard assumption, that when a state occurs, and all agents truthfully
report their information, they will know the realized state3. That is,
Assumption 1. For each ω,
⋂
j∈I E
Fj
j (ω) = {ω}, where EFjj (ω) de-
notes the element in Fj that contains the state ω.
2. µi : σ (Fi) → [0, 1] is agent i’s private prior, where σ (Fi) denotes the
algebra generated by the partition Fi. Note, if EFii =
{
ω, ω
′}
with
ω 6= ω′ , then the probability of the event EFii is well defined, but not
the probability of the event {ω} or the event {ω′}, i.e., an agent’s prior
maybe incomplete. Here, we assume
Assumption 2. For each i and for each event EFii ∈ Fi, µi
(
EFii
)
> 0.
3. ei : Ω→ R`+ is agent i’s random initial endowment. We require ei to be
Fi-measurable4. So that the information partition Fi indeed contains
all possible interim information of agent i.
4. ui : R`+ × Ω → R is agent i’s ex post utility function, taking the form
of ui (ci;ω), where ci denotes agent i’s consumption.
Let xi : Ω → R`+ denote agent i’s allocation (or in short, i-allocation).
Denote by Li the set of all possible allocations of agent i, and by x =
(x1, · · · , xN) an allocation of the above economy E . An allocation x is said
to be feasible, if for each ω ∈ Ω, ∑i∈I xi (ω) = ∑i∈I ei (ω).
3This assumption is without loss of generality, since if there exist two different states
ω and ω
′
, such that no agent is able to distinguish them, then the two states may as well
be treated as one state.
4That is, ei is constant on each element in Fi. More precisely, let agent i’s partition
be Fi and fix any ωk ∈ Ω. If ei : Ω → R`+ is Fi - measurable, then ei (ω) = ei (ωk)
for any ω ∈ EFii (ωk). Clearly, if each ei is state independent, then it is automatically
Fi-measurable.
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We postulate that the agents have maximin preferences, a case of Gilboa
and Schmeidler [14]. Unlike the standard ex-ante expected utility, the ex-ante
maximin expected utility of each allocation xi ∈ Li is well defined.
Let ∆i be the set of all probability measures over 2
Ω, that agree with the
agent i’s prior µi, formally,
∆i =
{
probability measure pii : 2
Ω → [0, 1] | pii (A) = µi (A) , ∀A ∈ σ (Fi)
}
.
Assumption 3. Take any two allocations of agent i, fi and hi, from the set
Li. Agent i prefers fi to hi under the maximin preferences, if
min
pii∈∆i
∑
ω∈Ω
ui (fi (ω) ;ω) pii (ω) ≥ min
pii∈∆i
∑
ω∈Ω
ui (hi (ω) ;ω) pii (ω) . (1.1)
de Castro-Yannelis [9] adopted the following equivalent formulation to
(1.1),
∑
E
Fi
i ∈Fi
(
min
ω∈EFii
ui (fi (ω) ;ω)
)
µi
(
EFii
) ≥ ∑
E
Fi
i ∈Fi
(
min
ω∈EFii
ui (hi (ω) ;ω)
)
µi
(
EFii
)
.
(1.2)
We employ the utility formulation by de Castro-Yannelis. Furthermore, we
say agent i strictly prefers fi to hi, if he prefers fi to hi but not the reverse.
The interest of these preferences come from not only that they can ac-
commodate the incompleteness of the agents’ priors, but also under these
preferences all efficient (first-best) allocations are incentive compatible. Fur-
thermore, only these preferences have this property in general (we refer in-
terested readers to de Castro-Yannelis [9]).
The last assumption we impose is that
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Assumption 4. For each i and for each fixed ci ∈ R`+, ui (ci; ·) is Fi-
measurable. That is, given any ci ∈ R`+, and any two states ω, ωˆ ∈ Ω,
with ω 6= ωˆ, we have ui (ci;ω) = ui (ci; ωˆ), whenever ω ∈ EFii (ωˆ).
The Fi-measurability of the ex post utility functions is, in fact, often as-
sumed in games with incomplete information. Indeed, one may regard, Fi
as agent i’s type space, and EFii ∈ Fi as a possible type of agent i. Then
clearly, assuming the function ui (ci; ·) to be Fi-measurable, is the same as
assuming ui to depend on agent i’s type.
1.3 Individually rational and ex-ante maximin efficient
notions
We will now define the notions of maximin core and maximin value allocation,
first introduced by de Castro-Yannelis [9]. Each notion is individually rational
and ex-ante maximin efficient.
An ex-ante core of an economy is a collection of desirable allocations, in
the sense that, each allocation provides the best possible insurance for the
agents.
The maximin core (an ex-ante core concept) is the set of feasible allo-
cations, that cannot be “improved upon” by any coalition of agents. The
“improved upon” idea is now based on the ex-ante maximin expected utility.
Formally,
Definition 1. A maximin core allocation is a feasible allocation x = (xi)i∈I
for which there is no coalition C ⊆ I, C 6= ∅, and an allocation of the
coalition (yi)i∈C satisfying for all ω ∈ Ω,
∑
i∈C yi (ω) =
∑
i∈C ei (ω), for all
i ∈ C, yi is preferred to xi under the maximin preferences, and for at least
one i ∈ C, yi is strictly preferred to xi.
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de Castro-Yannelis [9] pointed out that the existence of the maximin core
allocations follows from the standard balancedness condition (e.g. Scarf [33]),
provided that the ex post utility functions are concave and continuous in con-
sumption. Furthermore, they [9] showed that each maximin core allocation is
incentive compatible5. See de Castro, Pesce and Yannelis [11] for discussions
in a more general framework.
When the coalition is the grand coalition, i.e., C = I, we have the ex-ante
maximin efficiency notion. That is,
Definition 2. A feasible allocation x = (xi)i∈I is said to be ex-ante maximin
efficient, if there does not exist another feasible allocation y = (yi)i∈I , such
that for all i ∈ I, yi is preferred to xi ex-ante under the maximin preferences,
and for at least one i ∈ I, yi is strictly preferred to xi.
When C = {i}, we have the individually rational notion. That is,
Definition 3. A feasible allocation x = (xi)i∈I is said to be individually
rational, if for each i ∈ I, xi is preferred to ei ex-ante under the maximin
preferences.
5A feasible allocation x = (xi)i∈I is said to be maximin coalitional incentive compatible
(see de Castro-Yannelis [9], also de Castro, Pesce and Yannelis [12]) with respect to the
information structure {Fi}i∈I , if the following does not hold: there exists a coalition C
and two states a and b such that
1. EFii (a) = E
Fi
i (b) for all i /∈ C,
2. ei (a) + xi (b)− ei (b) ∈ R`+ for all i ∈ C, and
3. for all i ∈ C,
min
ω′∈EFii (a)
ui
(
yi
(
ω
′)
;ω
′)
> min
ω′∈EFii (a)
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′)
;ω
′)
,
where for all i ∈ C,
yi
(
ω
′)
=
{
ei (a) + xi (b)− ei (b) if ω′ = a
xi
(
ω
′
)
if otherwise.
7
Now, we introduce the notion of maximin value allocation, beginning with
the definition of a transferable utility game.
Definition 4. Given an economy E and a set of weights λ = {λi ≥ 0 : i = 1,
. . . , n} (not all λi’s equal to zero), Γλ = (I, Vλ) is the maximin transferable
utility game, where Vλ is defined on 2
I such that Vλ (∅) = 0 and for every
C ⊆ I
Vλ (C) = max
x
∑
i∈C
λi
∑
E
Fi
i ∈Fi
(
min
ω∈EFii
ui (xi (ω) ;ω)
)
µi
(
EFii
)
, subject to
∑
i∈C
xi (ω) =
∑
i∈C
ei (ω) , for all ω ∈ Ω.
Each C is called a coalition and Vλ (C) is the ‘worth’ of the coalition C.
The Shapley value of the game Γλ (Shapley [34]) assigns to each agent i
a payoff, Shi (Vλ), given by the formula below. It measures the sum of the
expected marginal contributions an agent can make to all the coalitions of
which she is a member of, i.e.,
Shi (Vλ) =
∑
{i}⊆C⊆I
(|C| − 1)! (|I| − |C|)!
|I|! [Vλ (C)− Vλ (C\ {i})] .
Definition 5. An allocation x is said to be a maximin value allocation, if
1.
∑n
i=1 xi (ω) =
∑n
i=1 ei (ω) for every ω ∈ Ω, and
2. there exist λi ≥ 0 ( i = 1, . . . , n, not all equal to zero), such that for all
i,
λi
∑
E
Fi
i ∈Fi
(
min
ω∈EFii
ui (xi (ω) ;ω)
)
µi
(
EFii
)
= Shi (Vλ) .
In other words, a maximin value allocation is a feasible allocation, having
the property that it yields to each agent a “weighted” maximin expected
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utility which equals to her Shapley value. The Shapley value in this case is
derived from a maximin transferable utility game. (Definition 4)
Each maximin value allocation is individually rational and ex-ante max-
imin efficient (See for example de Castro-Yannelis [9] and Angelopoulos-
Koutsougeras [2]). We refer interested readers to Angelopoulos-Koutsougeras
[2] for the existence of a maximin value allocation.
We indicate by means of an example that these individually rational and
ex-ante maximin efficient notions are different than the rational expectations
equilibrium (Allen [1], Radner [29]), or the Walrasian expectations equilib-
rium (Radner [28], [30]) or the private core notion (Yannelis [35]). We show
that these maximin notions not only exist in a situation that the Walrasian
expectations equilibrium (Radner [28]) fails to exist, but also achieve higher
efficiency.
The rational expectations equilibrium, Walrasian expectations equilibrium
and the private core were first defined in a Bayesian (standard) asymmetric
information economy6. In a Bayesian economy, agent i’s standard ex-ante
expected utility of an i-allocation xi is given by
νi (xi) =
∑
ω∈Ω
ui (xi (ω) ;ω)pii (ω) ,
where pii (ω) denotes the likelihood that agent i assigns to the state ω.
Agent i prefers the i-allocation, fi to hi, if the standard ex-ante expected
utility of fi is greater than or equal to the standard ex-ante expected utility
6A Bayesian asymmetric information economy is similar to an ambiguous asymmetric
information economy, except that there is no ambiguity – agents’ priors are defined at
every element of the state space; furthermore, the priors are common knowledge.
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of hi, i.e.,
∑
ω∈Ω
ui (fi (ω) ;ω)pii (ω) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
ui (hi (ω) ;ω) pii (ω) .
Agent i strictly prefers the i-allocation fi to hi, if he prefers fi to hi but not
the reverse.
Furthermore, for each agent i, let Gi be a partition of Ω. For ω ∈ Ω, denote
by EGii (ω) the element of Gi containing ω. Agent i’s Bayesian conditional
probability is defined as
pii
(
ω
′ | EGii (ω)
)
=

0 if ω
′
/∈ EGii (ω)
pii
(
ω
′)
pii
(
E
Gi
i (ω)
) if ω′ ∈ EGii (ω),
where pii
(
EGii (ω)
)
:=
∑
ω′∈EGii (ω)
pii
(
ω
′)
.
The Bayesian interim expected utility function of agent i, νi
(
xi | EGii (ω)
)
,
is given by
νi
(
xi | EGii (ω)
)
=
∑
ω′∈Ω
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)
pii
(
ω
′ | EGii (ω)
)
.
Definition 6. Let C ⊂ I denote a coalition. An allocation x = (x1, · · · , xN)
is said to be (Fi)i∈C -measurable, if for each i ∈ C, xi is Fi-measurable7 .
Note, in an ambiguous asymmetric information economy, if an i-allocation
xi is not Fi-measurable, then the standard ex-ante expected utility of xi is
not well defined. Take a very simple example, in which agent i’s ex post
utility function is state independent. Suppose the state space is Ω = {a, b}
and agent i’s partition is Fi = {{a, b}}, that is, he cannot distinguish the
states a and b even in the interim. By definition, his private prior is given
7That is, xi is constant on each element in Fi.
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by µi ({a, b}) = 1, µi (∅) = 0. Now, it is clear that he cannot evaluate the
allocation
xi = (xi (a) , xi (b)) = (1, 0) ,
which fails to be Fi-measurable, based on the standard ex-ante expected
utility. Indeed, the standard ex-ante expected utility of agent i is ui (xi (a))
µi (a) + ui (xi (b))µi (b), and it is not well defined, since he does not know
µi (a) or µi (b).
Let σ (p) be the smallest8 algebra of Ω for which the price system p is
measurable, and let σ (Gi) = σ (p) ∨ σ (Fi) denote the smallest algebra of
Ω containing both σ (p) and σ (Fi) 9. Then, Gi is the partition of Ω that
generates the algebra σ (Gi).
The two definitions below are taken from Allen [1] and Radner [29], [30],
[28].
Definition 7. A rational expectations equilibrium (REE), (p∗, x∗), consists
of a price system p∗ and a (Gi)i∈I -measurable10 allocation x∗ = (x∗1, · · · , x∗N),
such that
1. for each i and for each ω, x∗i (ω) maximizes νi
(
xi | EGii (ω)
)
subject to
the budget constraint p∗ (ω)xi (ω) ≤ p∗ (ω) ei (ω);
2.
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i (ω) =
∑N
i=1 ei (ω), for each ω ∈ Ω.
Definition 8. A Walrasian expectations equilibrium (WEE), (p∗, x∗), con-
sists of a price system p∗ and an (Fi)i∈I -measurable allocation x∗ = (x∗1, · · · ,
x∗N), such that
8Let σ1, σ2 be two algebras of Ω. σ1 is smaller than σ2, if σ1 ⊂ σ2.
9Recall, σ (Fi) denotes the algebra generated by the partition Fi.
10For each i, the i-allocation x∗i is Gi-measurable.
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1. for each i, the i-allocation x∗i maximizes νi (xi), subject to the budget
set
Bi (p
∗) :=
{
xi : Ω→ R`+ |xi is Fi-measurable, and
∑
ω∈Ω
p∗ (ω) · xi (ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
p∗ (ω) · ei (ω)
}
.
2.
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i (ω) =
∑N
i=1 ei (ω), for each ω ∈ Ω.
If we allow the total consumption at each state to be less than the total
endowment at that state,
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i (ω) ≤
∑N
i=1 ei (ω) for each ω ∈ Ω, and
have the total spending to be the same as the total income,
∑
ω∈Ω p (ω)∑N
i=1 x
∗
i (ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω p (ω)
∑N
i=1 ei (ω), then we have a free disposal WEE as
defined by Radner [30].
The definition below is taken from Yannelis [35].
Definition 9. A private core allocation is a feasible and (Fi)i∈I -measurable
allocation x = (xi)i∈I for which there is no coalition C ⊆ I, C 6= ∅, and an
(Fi)i∈C -measurable allocation for the coalition (yi)i∈C satisfying
∑
i∈C yi (ω) =∑
i∈C ei (ω), for all ω ∈ Ω, yi is preferred to xi for all i ∈ C, and yi is strictly
preferred to xi for at least one i ∈ C.
But these three notions, rational expectations equilibrium, Walrasian ex-
pectations equilibrium and the private core, can be readily applied to our
ambiguous asymmetric information economy11.
11In an ambiguous asymmetric information economy with Fi-measurable utility func-
tions, the standard ex-ante expected utility of any Fi-measurable i-allocation is well de-
fined. Indeed, let xi be an Fi-measurable i-allocation, then
νi (xi) =
∑
E
Fi
i ∈Fi
ui
(
xi
(
EFii
)
;EFii
)
µi
(
EFii
)
,
where ui
(
xi
(
EFii
)
;EFii
)
:= ui (xi (ω) ;ω) for some ω ∈ EFii . Similarly, the Bayesian
interim expected utility of a Gi-measurable allocation, νi
(
xi |EGii (ω)
)
, is also well defined.
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The difference of these three notions and the maximin notions can be seen
most clearly by means of the following example.
Example 1. There are two agents, one commodity, and three possible states
of nature Ω = {a, b, c}. The ex post utility function of each agent i is
ui (ci;ω) =
√
ci. The agents’ random initial endowments, information parti-
tions and private priors are:
(e1 (a) , e1 (b) , e1 (c)) = (5, 5, 0); F1 = {{a, b} , {c}}
(e2 (a) , e2 (b) , e2 (c)) = (5, 0, 5); F2 = {{a, c} , {b}}
µ1 ({a, b}) = 23 ; µ1 ({c}) = 13
µ2 ({a, c}) = 23 ; µ2 ({b}) = 13
When calculating the private core, the REE and the WEE, we assume
that each agent ignores his information constraint, and completes his prior
µi by assigning a non-zero probability to each state of nature
12. In our
setting, regardless of the ways the agents complete their priors, the following
results13 hold.
No trade (i.e., the initial endowment) is the unique private core allocation
and the unique REE allocation. Furthermore, it can be easily checked that a
WEE with positive prices14 does not exist. If we allow for free disposal, then
z =
z1 (a) z1 (b) z1 (c)
z2 (a) z2 (b) z2 (c)
 =
4 4 1
4 1 4

12µi (ω) > 0, for all ω and for all i, is a standard assumption imposed on a Bayesian
asymmetric information economy (for example, Yannelis [35]).
13See Glycopantis-Yannelis [18] for detailed calculations.
14That is, a WEE with p (ω) ≥ 0, for each ω.
13
is a (free disposal) WEE allocation, which requires each agent to throw away
a unit of the good at the state a.
Notice the allocation z is not incentive compatible. Indeed, suppose that
the realized state of nature is a, agent 1 is in the event {a, b} and he reports
{c}. Observe that agent 2 cannot distinguish between a and c, and may
believe that state c has occurred. In this case, agent 1 gets one unit from
agent 2. His Bayesian interim expected utility from lying is15
u1 (e1 (a) + z1 (c)− e1 (c) ; a)× pi1 (a | {a, b}) + u1 (z1 (b) ; b)× pi1 (b | {a, b})
=
√
6× pi1 (a | {a, b}) +
√
4× pi1 (b | {a, b}) ,
which is higher than the Bayesian interim expected utility of telling the truth,
u1 (z1 (a) ; a)× pi1 (a | {a, b}) + u1 (z1 (b) ; b)× pi1 (b | {a, b})
=
√
4× pi1 (a | {a, b}) +
√
4× pi1 (b | {a, b}) ,
where pi1 (a | {a, b}) > 0 and pi1 (b | {a, b}) > 0 are the conditional probabili-
ties.
The initial endowment fails to be ex-ante maximin efficient, since there
exists an alternative feasible allocation x that Pareto improves it16, where
x =
x1 (a) x1 (b) x1 (c)
x2 (a) x2 (b) x2 (c)
 =
5 4 1
5 1 4
 .
15Agent 1 can only successfully lie in the states that agent 2 cannot distinguish.
16Each agent i strictly prefers xi to ei under the maximin preferences,
2
3
√
min {5, 4}+ 1
3
√
1 = 1.67 >
2
3
√
min {5, 5}+ 1
3
√
0 = 1.49.
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The feasible, individually rational, and ex-ante maximin efficient allocation
x is in fact a maximin core allocation and a maximin value allocation.
Clearly, in this example, the maximin notions, the private core, the REE
and the WEE are different. Most importantly, the maximin notions allow the
agents to trade and reach a Pareto superior outcome, which is also incentive
compatible (see footnote 6 for the definition of incentive compatible under
maximin preferences). de Castro-Yannelis [9] show that with the allocation
x, no agent has an incentive to misreport his privately observed event under
the maximin preferences.
Indeed, if state a is realized, then agent 1 sees the event {a, b}. He can
report the true event {a, b} or he can lie and report the event {c}. Suppose
agent 1 lies (i.e., reports the event {c}). Notice that agent 2 cannot distin-
guish the states a from the state c, and may believe that state c has occurred.
In this case, agent 1 gets e1 (a) + x1 (c)− e1 (c) = 6.
His maximin expected utility from lying is
min {u1 (e1 (a) + x1 (c)− e1 (c) ; a) , u1 (x1 (b) ; b)} = min
{√
6,
√
4
}
=
√
4.
When agent 1 does not misreport, he gets
min {u1 (x1 (a) ; a) , u1 (x1 (b) ; b)} = min
{√
5,
√
4
}
=
√
4.
Consequently, agent 1 does not gain by misreporting.
Clearly, the allocation x performs better than the free disposal WEE al-
location z. More precisely, the allocation x is both efficient and incentive
compatible in the maximin framework, whereas the allocation z is neither
first best efficient nor incentive compatible in the Bayesian framework.
15
The maximin notions seem to be desirable. But, could one provide a
noncooperative foundation for these notions? That is, can each individually
rational and ex-ante maximin efficient allocation be reached by means of
noncooperation? We address this question in the next sections.
1.4 Implementation
1.4.1 The direct revelation mechanism
A direct revelation mechanism, associated with an ex-ante maximin efficient
allocation and its underlying ambiguous asymmetric information economy,
is a noncooperative game, in which agents (players) need to decide what to
report after a state of nature is realized. To ease the understanding, we
describe the game first, and then define it formally.
In the interim, a state of nature ω is realized, each player i privately
observes the event EFii (ω) and receives the initial endowment ei (ω). Then,
each player i strategically writes down his report EFii ∈ Fi on a piece of
paper and puts it in a sealed envelope.
The report EFii , however, may or may not be truthful. That is, for player i,
the reported event EFii may be different from the observed true event E
Fi
i (ω).
Definition 10. Suppose the realized state (the true state) is ω. Then, a
report of player i, EFii ∈ Fi, is a lie, if it differs from the event EFii (ω).
The players’ envelopes are opened at the same time. Based on the players’
reports, redistribution takes place. Figure 1 shows the time line.
A planned redistribution (net transfer) is the adjustments needed to go
from the initial endowment e to a planned allocation x.
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Definition 11. Let x be the planned allocation. The planned redistribution
is given by x− e.
For example, given the allocation x of Example 1, the planned redistribu-
tion x− e is:
(x1 (a)− e1 (a) , x1 (b)− e1 (b) , x1 (c)− e1 (c)) = (0,−1, 1);
(x2 (a)− e2 (a) , x2 (b)− e2 (b) , x2 (c)− e2 (c)) = (0, 1,−1).
It says, if the players agree that state a has occurred, then everyone keeps
what they have; but if the players agree that state b has occurred, then player
1 is to give one unit of the good to player 2; etc.
The actual redistribution, on the other hand, depends on the planned redis-
tribution, the players’ reports EF11 , · · · , EFNN , and the realized state of nature
ω. From Assumption 1, we know for any collection of reports EF11 , · · · , EFNN ,
the
⋂
i∈I E
Fi
i is either singleton or empty. So clearly, for the reports to be
compatible, they must not contradict with each other. Yet, this requirement
is not sufficient. We also need every player to have enough endowment to
carry out the planned redistribution. More precisely,
Definition 12. We say the reports EF11 , · · · , EFNN are compatible at the state
ω, if
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1.
⋂
i∈I E
Fi
i = {ω˜}, and
2. ei (ω) + (xi (ω˜)− ei (ω˜)) ∈ R`+ for all i ∈ I.
Furthermore, we refer the state ω˜ as the implied state (the agreed state).
When the reports EF11 , · · · , EFNN are compatible at the state ω, the players
will end up with e (ω)+x (ω˜)−e (ω˜), where ω˜ is the implied state, and x (ω˜)−
e (ω˜) is the planned redistribution specified for the state ω˜. Clearly, if all the
players tell the truth, then ω˜ = ω and the players get what they planned to
get, e (ω)+x (ω)−e (ω) = x (ω). But, since some player may successfully lie,
ω˜ may not be the true state. As a consequence, e (ω)+x (ω˜)−e (ω˜) may differ
from x (ω), i.e., the players may not end up with the planned allocation.
If the reports are not compatible at the realized state ω, then the players
believe that they will redistribute their initial endowments according to the
planned redistribution specified for the realized state. Consequently, the
players have e (ω) + x (ω)− e (ω) = x (ω).
One may imagine that there exists an outside authority, for example, a
court, which can figure out the realized state. We hasten to point out that
having an outside authority does not lessen the value of the mechanism. In-
deed, having the outside authority to identify each realized state and enforce
the planned allocation can be costly. With the mechanism, the outside au-
thority only needs to serve as a credible threat, i.e., whenever the reports
are not compatible, it can enforce the correct redistribution. Now, if the
mechanism induces all the players to report truthfully, then the planned al-
location will be reached at no cost. That is, the players will reach the planned
allocation by themselves, without using the outside authority.
Definition 13. Let x− e denote a planned redistribution, (EF11 , · · · , EFNN ) a
list of reports, and ω a realized state of nature. Then the actual redistribution
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is given by
D
(
x− e, (EF11 , · · · , EFNN ) , ω) =

x (ω˜)− e (ω˜) if the reports are
compatible at ω;
x (ω)− e (ω) otherwise;
where ω˜ and ω denote the implied state and the realized state respectively,
and Di
(
x− e, (EF11 , · · · , EFNN ) , ω) denotes the amount player i gives to or
takes from the others.
Now, we gradually define the game. A decision node of player i is a
circumstance that he might be called upon to act (in Figure 2, it is denoted
by a dot.). An information set of player i, Ii, is the set of all of his decision
nodes that look the same to him (the players’ information sets are illustrated
by the dotted lines in Figure 2). Let Ii denote the set of player i’s information
sets. That is, Ii contains all of the distinct circumstances that player i might
be called upon to act.
A strategy of player i is a function, si : Ii → Fi. In words, player i’s
strategy is a complete plan of reports, that specifies a report for the player
conditional on each distinct circumstance that he might be called upon to
act. But each information set corresponds to a unique event. Indeed, if state
ω is realized and the player i ends up at the information set Ii |ω, then he
only knows that the event EFii (ω) has occurred. So for simplicity, we slightly
abuse the notation, defining player i’s strategy as a function that goes from
the set Fi to the set itself.
Definition 14. A strategy of player i is a function si : Fi → Fi.
In words, it says a strategy of player i is a complete plan of reports, that
specifies a report for him conditional on each possible event that he might
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observe from nature.
Let Si denote player i’s strategy set – the collection of all possible strategies
of player i; S := ×i∈ISi the strategy set, and s ∈ S a strategy profile.
Furthermore, with a slightly abused notation, we use s (ω) to denote the
players’ reports, when they adopt the strategy profile s, and the realized
state is ω. That is, s (ω) :=
(
s1
(
EΠ11 (ω)
)
, · · · , sN
(
EΠNN (ω)
))
. Clearly, for
any ω ∈ Ω, s (ω) ∈ ×i∈IFi.
Definition 15. A direct revelation mechanism, associated with a planned
allocation x and its underlying ambiguous asymmetric information economy
E = {Ω; (Fi, µi, ei, ui)i∈I}, denoted by Γ = 〈I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I〉, is a
set, where
1. I = {1, · · · , N} is the set of N players;
2. S is the players’ strategies set; for each s ∈ S, we have si : Fi → Fi
for all i;
3. x− e denotes the planned redistribution;
4. gi : F1 × · · · × FN × Ω → R`+ is the outcome function for player i. It
depends on the reports of all the players
(
EF11 , · · · , EFNN
) ∈ F1×· · ·×FN
and the realized state of nature ω ∈ Ω. It takes the form of
gi
((
EF11 , · · · , EFNN
)
, ω
)
= ei (ω) +Di
(
x− e, (EF11 , · · · , EFNN ) , ω) ,
(1.3)
where ei (ω)+Di
(
x− e, (EF11 , · · · , EFNN ) , ω) is the bundle of the goods,
that player i ends up consuming. In particular, if the players adopt the
strategy profile s and the state ω is realized, then we have
gi (s (ω) , ω) = ei (ω) +Di (x− e, s (ω) , ω) ;
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5. and finally, ui : R`+ × Ω → R is player i’s ex post utility function,
taking the form of ui (ci;ω), where ci denotes agent i’s consumption
(as defined in the economy E).
For convenience, we define, for each player i, a final payoff function. It
tells us the final payoff that the player i ends up, given a list of reports and
a realized state of nature. Formally,
Definition 16. Denote by vi : F1 × · · · × FN × Ω → R, vi := ui ◦ gi, the
final payoff function of player i. It depends on the reports of all the players(
EF11 , · · · , EFNN
) ∈ F1 × · · · × FN and the realized state of nature ω ∈ Ω,
taking the form of
vi
((
EF11 , · · · , EFNN
)
;ω
)
= ui
(
gi
((
EF11 , · · · , EFNN
)
, ω
)
;ω
)
= ui
(
ei (ω) +Di
(
x− e, (EF11 , · · · , EFNN ) , ω) ;ω) .
To ease the understanding, we illustrate the mechanism with an example.
1.4.2 An example
Example 2. Consider the ambiguous asymmetric information economy of
Example 1. That is, there are two agents, one commodity, and three possible
states of nature Ω = {a, b, c}. The ex post utility function of each agent
i is ui (ci;ω) =
√
ci. The agents’ random initial endowments, information
partitions and private priors are:
(e1 (a) , e1 (b) , e1 (c)) = (5, 5, 0); F1 = {{a, b} , {c}}
(e2 (a) , e2 (b) , e2 (c)) = (5, 0, 5); F2 = {{a, c} , {b}}
µ1 ({a, b}) = 23 ; µ1 ({c}) = 13
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µ2 ({a, c}) = 23 ; µ2 ({b}) = 13
Suppose the planned allocation is the individually rational and ex-ante
maximin efficient allocation x of Example 1. Then, the planned redistribution
x− e is
(x1 (a)− e1 (a) , x1 (b)− e1 (b) , x1 (c)− e1 (c)) = (0,−1, 1);
(x2 (a)− e2 (a) , x2 (b)− e2 (b) , x2 (c)− e2 (c)) = (0, 1,−1).
When a state of nature is realized, each player privately observes an event
and receives the initial endowment. Then, each player writes down his or her
report on a piece of paper and puts it in a sealed envelope. All the envelopes
are opened at the same time, and redistribution takes place.
For simplicity, let F1 = {A1, c1}, where A1 := EF11 (a) = EF11 (b) = {a, b},
c1 := E
F1
1 (c) = {c}, and similarly let F2 = {A2, b2}, where A2 = {a, c},
b2 = {b}.
For purposes of clarity, we present the game in an informal game tree17
(Figure 2).
Nature chooses a state, a, b or c. Player 1 (pl1) cannot distinguish between
a and b, and player 2 (pl2) between a and c; furthermore, when a player acts,
he (she) does not know what the other does. This accounts for the non-
singleton information sets I1, I2 and I ′2 in Figure 2. At such an information
set, the player of the move cannot distinguish between the decision nodes
within, and therefore his (or her) decisions are common to all of them.
For example, if the state a is realized, then player 1 (she) observes the event
A1 (she finds herself at the information set I1) and player 2 (he) observes the
17It is an informal game tree, since the pair assigned to each terminal node of the tree
does not denote the players’ final payoffs, but rather the quantity of the good that player
1 and player 2 end up consuming respectively.
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event A2 (he finds himself at the information set I2). Player 1 can report ‘I
have seen the event A1’ or ‘I have seen the event c1’; player 2 can report ‘I
have seen the event A2’ or ‘I have seen the event b2’.
The quantity of the good that each player ends up consuming, is deter-
mined by the realized state and the reports of all the players, according to
the outcome function (equation (1.3)).
To illustrate, suppose the state a is realized, player 1 reports the event
c1 (she lies), and player 2 truthfully reports the event A2 (we are look-
ing at the path ac1A2 on the tree). Clearly, the reports are compatible
at the state a, and the implied state is c. The actual redistribution is then
D (x− e, (c1, A2) , a) = x (c) − e (c), and the outcome functions tell us that
player 1 ends up with 6 units and player 2 ends up with 4 units, i.e.,
g1 ((c1, A2) , a) = e1 (a) +D1 (x− e, (c1, A2) , a)
= e1 (a) + x1 (c)− e1 (c) = 5 + 1− 0 = 6;
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and
g2 ((c1, A2) , a) = e2 (a) +D2 (x− e, (c1, A2) , a)
= e2 (a) + x2 (c)− e2 (c) = 5 + 4− 5 = 4.
We record this outcome (g1 ((c1, A2) , a) , g2 ((c1, A2) , a)) = (6, 4) at the end
of the path ac1A2 in Figure 2.
As a consequence, the final payoff each player enjoys is given by
v1 ((c1, A2) ; a) = u1 (g1 ((c1, A2) , a) ; a) = u1 (6; a) =
√
6
and
v2 ((c1, A2) ; a) = u2 (g2 ((c1, A2) , a) ; a) = u2 (4; a) =
√
4.
Furthermore, in this game, a strategy profile of the game can be (as indi-
cated by the bold lines on the tree)
s =
(
s1 (I1) = A1, s1
(
I ′1
)
= c1; s2 (I2) = A2, s2
(
I ′2
)
= b2
)
,
or in our simplified notation,
s = (s1 (A1) = A1, s1 (c1) = c1; s2 (A2) = A2, s2 (b2) = b2) .
In words, this strategy profile says every player reports exactly what he or
she sees.
Given this strategy profile s and a state of nature ω, the list of reports s (ω)
is uniquely determined. For example, s (a) = (s1 (A1) , s2 (A2)) = (A1, A2).
So if the players act according to the strategy profile s and state a is
realized (we are looking at the path aA1A2 on the tree), then both players
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will end up with 5 units of the good, i.e.,
g1 (s (a) , a) = g1 ((A1, A2) , a) = e1 (a) + x1 (a)− e1 (a) = 5,
and
g2 (s (a) , a) = g2 ((A1, A2) , a) = e2 (a) + x2 (a)− e2 (a) = 5.
Hence, the players will end up at the pair (g1 ((A1, A2) , a) , g2 ((A1, A2) , a)) =
(5, 5), which is recorded at the end of the path aA1A2 in Figure 2.
1.4.3 The problem of implementation
We study the implementation of each individually rational and ex-ante max-
imin efficient allocation with the help of its corresponding direct revelation
mechanism. In particular, we say an individually rational and ex-ante max-
imin efficient allocation x is implementable, if x can be realized through
an equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I ,
{ui}i∈I
〉
.
Let S denote a game theoretic solution concept, and S (Γ) the set of S
equilibria of the mechanism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
.
Definition 17. Let x denote an individually rational and ex-ante maximin
efficient allocation of an ambiguous asymmetric information economy E, and
S (Γ) the set of S equilibria of the mechanism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
.
We say the allocation x is implementable as an S equilibrium of the mecha-
nism Γ if,
∃s∗ ∈ S (Γ) , such that gi (s∗ (ω) , ω) = xi (ω) ,
for each ω ∈ Ω and for each i ∈ I.
Definition 18. We say a strategy profile s is truth telling, if according to
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it, every player reports the truth whenever it is his turn to report. That is,
for each player i and for each state ω, if he observes the event EFii (ω) from
nature, then his action is to report the true event, i.e., si
(
EFii (ω)
)
= EFii (ω).
We denote such a strategy profile by sT .
Remark 1. Clearly, if the truth telling strategy profile sT constitutes an S
equilibrium of the mechanism Γ, i.e., sT ∈ S (Γ), then the allocation x is im-
plementable as an S equilibrium of the mechanism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I ,
{ui}i∈I
〉
.
Indeed, under the truth telling strategy profile sT , the list of reports asso-
ciated with each state ω is
sT (ω) =
(
EF11 (ω) , · · · , EFNN (ω)
)
.
That is, the players always tell the truth. As a consequence, we have
gi
(
sT (ω) , ω
)
= gi
((
EF11 (ω) , · · · , EFNN (ω)
)
, ω
)
= ei (ω) +Di
(
x− e, (EF11 (ω) , · · · , EFNN (ω)) , ω)
= ei (ω) + xi (ω)− ei (ω) = xi (ω) ,
for each ω ∈ Ω and for each i ∈ I – the requirement of definition 17.
Furthermore, when sT ∈ S (Γ), we say Γ has a truth telling S equilibrium.
An immediate question is that, what would be a reasonable solution con-
cept for Γ? In view of the ambiguous asymmetric information economy, the
standard Bayesian Nash solution concept is not suitable here, in the sense
that it cannot accommodate the players’ information constraints. Neverthe-
less, we can still use the Bayesian Nash solution concept, if we were to ignore
these information constraints, and assume that the players are able to as-
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sign a probability to everything they do not know. However, the predicted
outcomes may fail to be convincing. Indeed, it is well known by now, from
the Ellsberg’s paradox (recall the Ellsberg example), that if we assume the
players know more than what they actually know, we may fail to explain
their actions.
In Section 1.4.4, we introduce the maximin solution concept, which seems
to be a suitable equilibrium notion in our framework. To illustrate the differ-
ences between the Bayesian Nash solution concept and the maximin solution
concept, we compare their predictions. In the remaining of this section, we
show, in Example 3, that the Bayesian Nash solution concept suggests no
truth telling. That is, the individually rational and ex-ante maximin effi-
cient allocation x of Example 1 fails to be Bayesian incentive compatible in
the sense of Holmstro¨m and Myerson [20].
Example 3. Recall, in Example 2, the players’ information partitions are
F1 = {A1, c1} and F2 = {A2, b2}, where A1 = {a, b}, c1 = {c}, A2 = {a, c},
and b2 = {b}. Their private priors are
µ1 ({a, b}) = 23 , µ1 ({c}) = 13 ; µ2 ({a, c}) = 23 , µ2 ({b}) = 13 .
In order to apply the Bayesian Nash equilibrium concept to Example 2, we
need to ignore the players’ information constraints on the state of nature,
and assume player 1’s private priors are µ1 ({a}) = p, µ1 ({b}) = 23 − p and
µ1 ({c}) = 13 , where 0 < p < 23 ; player 2’s are µ2 ({a}) = q, µ2 ({b}) = 13 and
µ2 ({c}) = 23 − q, where 0 < q < 23 .
The Bayesian Nash solution concept predicts no truth telling equilibrium.
Indeed, suppose that the realized state of nature is a, agent 1 is in the event
A1 = {a, b}, and she reports c1 = {c}. With the updated beliefs µ1 ({a} |A1)
= µ1 ({a}) /µ1 (A1) = 3p2 and µ1 ({b} |A1) = µ1 ({b}) /µ1 (A1) = 1− 3p2 , agent
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1’s Bayesian interim expected utility from lying is
u1 (g1 (c1, A2, a) ; a) · 3p
2
+ u1 (g1 (c1, b2, b) ; b) ·
(
1− 3p
2
)
= u1 (e1 (a) + x1 (c)− e1 (c) ; a) · 3p
2
+ u1 (x1 (b) ; b) ·
(
1− 3p
2
)
=
√
6 · 3p
2
+
√
4 ·
(
1− 3p
2
)
,
which is higher than the Bayesian interim expected utility of telling the truth,
u1 (g1 (A1, A2, a) ; a) · 3p
2
+ u1 (g1 (A1, b2, b) ; b) ·
(
1− 3p
2
)
= u1 (x1 (a) ; a) · 3p
2
+ u1 (x1 (b) ; b) ·
(
1− 3p
2
)
=
√
5 · 3p
2
+
√
4 ·
(
1− 3p
2
)
.
Here, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium concept suggests no truth telling. We
will show that the maximin solution concept predicts truth telling.
1.4.4 Maximin equilibrium
We postulate that the players do not define their objectives based on some-
thing that they do not know; and in an equilibrium, every player’s action
choice is the best with respect to his objective.
Clearly, with a limited ability to form probabilities, maximizing one’s stan-
dard expected payoff may not be well defined. Here, we postulate that the
players maximize their payoff lower bound. This objective is well defined
– every player knows the worst possible payoff associated with each of his
actions; and every player clearly knows what to do to achieve his objective.
With this objective, an equilibrium becomes a situation in which, no mat-
ter what event a player observes from nature, his action insures him the
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best worst payoff, hence the name, a maximin equilibrium. In particular,
each agent maximizes his payoff lowest bound, i.e., each player maximizes
the payoff that takes into account the worst actions of all the other players
against him and also the worst state that can occur.
Definition 19. In a direct revelation mechanism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I ,
{ui}i∈I
〉
, a strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s∗N) constitutes a maximin equilib-
rium (ME), if for each player i, his strategy s∗i maximizes his interim payoff
lower bound, that is, the function s∗i : Fi → Fi satisfies, for each EFii ∈ Fi,
min
E
F−i
−i ∈F−i; ω′∈E
Fi
i
vi
(
s∗i
(
EFii
)
, E
F−i
−i ;ω
′
)
≥ min
E
F−i
−i ∈F−i; ω′∈E
Fi
i
vi
(
EˆFii , E
F−i
−i ;ω
′
)
,
(1.4)
for all EˆFii ∈ Fi; where EF−i−i denotes the reports from all the other players,
so E
F−i
−i ∈ F−i := ×j 6=iFj.
The maximin equilibrium formulation is consistent with the multiple priors
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [14] and the maximin preferences. Indeed,
here, we assume that in the interim, each player i is uncertain about the
strategy choice of all the other players, and the realized state of nature ω.
That is, the relevant state space for player i is S−i ×EFii (ω). Let Bi denote
player i’s all possible beliefs over this state space, i.e., Bi is the set of all
probability measures defined on the power set of the state space S−i×EFii (ω).
Clearly, the set Bi is non-empty. Also, since the players’ strategy sets and
the set EFii (ω) ⊆ Ω are finite, the set Bi is closed and convex.
Since the players are ambiguity averse, in the interim they choose EFii ∈ Fi
to maximize
min
pi∈Bi
∑
(s−i,ω′)∈S−i×EFii (ω)
vi
(
EFii , s−i (ω
′) ;ω′
) · pi (s−i, ω′) . (1.5)
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Now, since the set Bi contains all possible probability measures, the objective
function (1.5) is equivalent to
min
E
F−i
−i ∈F−i; ω′∈E
Fi
i
vi
(
EFii , E
F−i
−i ;ω
′
)
, (1.6)
which is the formulation used in the maximin equilibrium.
Definition 20. If the truth telling strategy profile sT 18 constitutes a maximin
equilibrium of the mechanism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
, then we say
that the mechanism Γ has a truth telling maximin equilibrium.
1.4.5 Implementation
This section presents our main result, i.e., in the mechanism Γ = 〈I, S, x− e,
{gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
, where x is individually rational and ex-ante maximin ef-
ficient, no player has an incentive to lie. It implies that every individu-
ally rational and ex-ante maximin efficient allocation x is implementable
through its corresponding direct revelation mechanism Γ = 〈I, S, x− e,
{gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
. Formally,
Theorem 1. Denote by x an individually rational and ex-ante maximin effi-
cient allocation of an ambiguous asymmetric information economy E, and
ME (Γ) the set of maximin equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism
Γ = 〈I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
. Then, there exists a truth telling maximin
equilibrium sT , which is the unique maximin equilibrium of the mechanism
Γ ( i.e.,
{
sT
}
= ME (Γ) ), for which we have gi
(
sT (ω) , ω
)
= xi (ω), for
each ω ∈ Ω and for each i ∈ I, i.e., the allocation x is implementable as a
maximin equilibrium of its corresponding mechanism Γ.
18The truth telling strategy profile sT takes the form of sTi
(
EFii
)
= EFii , for all E
Fi
i ∈
Fi, and for all i.
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Remark 2. The implementation shares some similarities with the truthful
implementation of Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin [3, p.189] – an allocation
can be truthfully implemented, if there exists a direct revelation mechanism
(a game in which players report their private information) for which truth
telling is its equilibrium (based on some game theoretic solution concept),
and the truth telling equilibrium yields the allocation as its outcome.
Remark 3. We differ from the full implementation of Jackson [21], Palfrey
and Srivastava’s [31], and Hahn and Yannelis [19], in that, we do not imple-
ment a set of allocations. Instead, we show, given any arbitrary individually
rational and ex-ante maximin efficient allocation x, its corresponding mech-
anism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
yields the allocation x as its unique
maximin equilibrium outcome.
Corollary 1. Any maximin core allocation and any maximin value allocation
is implementable as a maximin equilibrium.
Proof. Since the notions, maximin core and maximin value allocation are
individually rational and ex-ante efficient under the maximin preferences,
the result follows from the Theorem 1.
Here, we illustrate the main theorem by means of an example.
Example 4. We reconsider Example 2, i.e., there are two agents, one com-
modity, and three possible states of nature Ω = {a, b, c}. The ex post utility
function of each agent i is ui (ci;ω) =
√
ci. The agents’ random initial en-
dowments, information partitions and private priors are:
(e1 (a) , e1 (b) , e1 (c)) = (5, 5, 0); F1 = {{a, b} , {c}}
(e2 (a) , e2 (b) , e2 (c)) = (5, 0, 5); F2 = {{a, c} , {b}}
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µ1 ({a, b}) = 23 ; µ1 ({c}) = 13
µ2 ({a, c}) = 23 ; µ2 ({b}) = 13
The planned allocation is
x =
x1 (a) x1 (b) x1 (c)
x2 (a) x2 (b) x2 (c)
 =
5 4 1
5 1 4
 .
The planned redistribution x− e is
(x1 (a)− e1 (a) , x1 (b)− e1 (b) , x1 (c)− e1 (c)) = (0,−1, 1);
(x2 (a)− e2 (a) , x2 (b)− e2 (b) , x2 (c)− e2 (c)) = (0, 1,−1).
The game tree is presented again in Figure 3, in which for simplicity, we
let A1 = {a, b}, c1 = {c}, A2 = {a, c}, and b2 = {b}.
We will show that the truth telling strategy profile constitutes the only
maximin equilibrium of the game, and the immediate consequence is that
the allocation x is implemented.
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Formally, we will show that the strategy profile
s = (s1 (A1) = A1, s1 (c1) = c1; s2 (A2) = A2, s2 (b2) = b2) ,
constitutes the only maximin equilibrium of the game.
We look at player 1 first, she has two information sets I1 and I ′1. (Figure
4)
If she is at I1, then she must have seen the event A1 from nature. She
can either tell the truth A1 or the lie c1. Recall, player 1 cannot distinguish
the two decision nodes within the set I1, so her action is common at the two
nodes. Figure 4a shows that, being truthful (reports A1), she may end up
with, from the left to the right, 5, 4, 5 or 4 units of the good19; and by lying
(reports c1), she may end up with, from the left to the right, 6, 5, 4 or 4
units of the good.
19That is, at the information set I1, if player 1 tells the truth, then she may go down
one of the four paths ‘aA1A2’, ‘aA1b2’, ‘bA1A2’ and ‘bA1b2’, for which she ends up with
g1 ((A1, A2) , a) = 5, g1 ((A1, b2) , a) = 4, g1 ((A1, A2) , b) = 5, and g1 ((A1, b2) , b) = 4 units
of the good respectively.
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Clearly, when player 1 observes the event A1, telling the truth (reports A1)
gives her a lower bound payoff of
min {v1 (A1, A2; a) , v1 (A1, b2; a) , v1 (A1, A2; b) , v1 (A1, b2; b)}
= min
{√
5,
√
4,
√
5,
√
4
}
=
√
4;
lying (reports c1) gives her a lower bound payoff of
min {v1 (c1, A2; a) , v1 (c1, b2; a) , v1 (c1, A2; b) , v1 (c1, b2; b)}
= min
{√
6,
√
5,
√
4,
√
4
}
=
√
4.
So when she observes the event A1, she has no incentive to lie, i.e., s1 (A1) =
A1 constitutes part of a maximin equilibrium of the game.
If player 1 is at I ′1, then she must have seen the event c1 from nature.
Figure 4b shows that, if she tells the truth (reports c1), then she will get 1
unit of the good, no matter what player 2 reports; but if she lies (reports
A1), then she may end up with, 0 or 1 unit of the good. Here, telling the
truth (reports c1) gives her a lower bound payoff of
min {v1 (c1, A2; c) , v1 (c1, b2; c)} = min
{√
1,
√
1
}
= 1;
lying (reports A1) gives her a lower bound payoff of
min {v1 (A1, A2; c) , v1 (A1, b2; c)} = min
{√
0,
√
1
}
= 0.
So when she observes the event c1, she should report the event c1, i.e.,
s1 (c1) = c1 constitutes part of a maximin equilibrium of the game.
Now, turn to player 2. He has two information sets also, I2 and I ′2. (Figure
34
5)
If player 2 is at I2, then he must have seen the event A2 from nature.
Figure 5a shows that, being truthful (reports A2), he may end up with, from
the left to the right, 5, 4, 5 or 4 units of the good; and by lying (reports b2),
he may end up with, from the left to the right, 6, 5, 4 or 4 units of the good.
Clearly, telling the truth (reports A2) gives him a lower bound payoff of
min {v2 (A1, A2; a) , v2 (c1, A2; a) , v2 (A1, A2; c) , v2 (c1, A2; c)}
= min
{√
5,
√
4,
√
5,
√
4
}
=
√
4;
lying (reports b2) gives her a lower bound payoff of
min {v2 (A1, b2; a) , v2 (c1, b2; a) , v2 (A1, b2; c) , v2 (c1, b2; c)}
= min
{√
6,
√
5,
√
4,
√
4
}
=
√
4.
35
So when he observes the event A2, he has no incentive to lie, i.e., s2 (A2) = A2
constitutes part of a maximin equilibrium of the game.
If player 2 is at I ′2, then he must have seen the event b2 from nature. Figure
5b shows that if he tells the truth, then he will get 1 unit of the good, no
matter what player 1 reports; but if he lies, then he may end up with, 0 or 1
unit of the good. Here, telling the truth (reports b2) gives him a lower bound
payoff of
min {v2 (A1, b2; b) , v2 (c1, b2; b)} = min
{√
1,
√
1
}
= 1;
lying (reports A2) gives him a lower bound payoff of
min {v2 (A1, A2; b) , v2 (c1, A2; b)} = min
{√
0,
√
1
}
= 0.
So when he observes the event b2, he should report the event b2, i.e., s2 (b2) =
b2 constitutes part of a maximin equilibrium of the game.
Now, put together, the strategy profile
s = (s1 (A1) = A1, s1 (c1) = c1; s2 (A2) = A2, s2 (b2) = b2) ,
is a maximin equilibrium of the game. It is, in fact, the only maximin
equilibrium of the game20.
The equilibrium report paths are s (a) = (s1 (A1) , s2 (A2)) = (A1, A2),
s (b) = (s1 (A1) , s2 (b2)) = (A1, b2) and s (c) = (s1 (c1) , s2 (A2)) = (c1, A2).
(as marked in Figure 6)
Now, it can be easily checked that the individually rational and ex-ante
20We assume that a player lies, only if he can benefit from doing so.
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maximin efficient allocation
x =
x1 (a) x1 (b) x1 (c)
x2 (a) x2 (b) x2 (c)
 =
5 4 1
5 1 4

is implemented, since we have
g1 (s (a) , a) = g1 ((A1, A2) , a) = 5 + 5− 5 = 5 = x1 (a) ,
and similarly, we have g2 (s (a) , a) = 5 = x2 (a), g1 (s (b) , b) = 4 = x1 (b),
g2 (s (b) , b) = 1 = x2 (b), g1 (s (c) , c) = 1 = x1 (c), g2 (s (c) , c) = 4 = x2 (c).
These outcomes are illustrated in Figure 6, as pairs following the equilibrium
paths.
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1.4.6 Proof of Theorem 1
To ease the explanation, we introduce some notation. We use F−i := ×j 6=iFj
to denote the action set of all the players except player i, and E
F−i
−i :=(
EF11 , · · · , EFi−1i−1 , EFi+1i+1 , · · · , EFNN
)
∈ F−i reports of all the players expect
player i.
Furthermore, we write ω ∈ EF−i−i or EF−i−i (ω), if the state ω belongs to
each element in the list
(
EF11 , · · · , EFi−1i−1 , EFi+1i+1 , · · · , EFNN
)
; and we use
EFii
⋂
E
F−i
−i :=
⋂
j∈I E
Fj
j to denote the information revealed by the reports
of all the players.
Let x be an individually rational and ex-ante maximin efficient allocation.
Suppose that the mechanism Γ does not have a truth telling maximin equi-
librium. Then, there must exist a player i, an event EFii , and a lie E˜
Fi
i ∈ Fi
(clearly, E˜Fii 6= EFii ), such that when the player i observes the event EFii , he
can insure a better lower bound payoff by lying, i.e.,
min
E
F−i
−i ∈F−i;
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
EFii , E
F−i
−i ;ω
′
)}
< min
E
F−i
−i ∈F−i;
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
E˜Fii , E
F−i
−i ;ω
′
)}
. (1.7)
We will show, in Step 1 and 2, that (1.7) cannot hold, and therefore every
game Γ has a truth telling maximin equilibrium.
To ease the explanation, denote the LHS of (1.7) by
vi
(
EFii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) := min
E
F−i
−i ∈F−i; ω′∈E
Fi
i
{
vi
(
EFii , E
F−i
−i ;ω
′
)}
,
where E∗−i ∈ F−i and ω∗ ∈ EFii solve the minimization problem above.
Step 1 We will show that if vi
(
EFii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) = ui (xi (ω∗) ;ω∗) and (1.7)
holds, then x fails to be an ex-ante maximin efficient allocation.
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Notice, vi
(
EFii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) = ui (xi (ω∗) ;ω∗) implies21
vi
(
EFii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) = min
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
EFii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
. (1.8)
Also, (1.7) implies22
vi
(
EFii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) < min
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
E˜Fii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
. (1.9)
Now, (1.8) and (1.9) together imply
min
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
EFii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
< min
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
E˜Fii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
.
(1.10)
Finally, Lemma 1 (see the Appendix) shows that if (1.10) holds, then x
fails to be an ex-ante maximin efficient allocation, a contradiction.
Step 2 We will show that if vi
(
EFii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) 6= ui (xi (ω∗) ;ω∗) and (1.7)
holds, then x fails to be an ex-ante maximin efficient allocation.
Notice, vi
(
EFii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) 6= ui (xi (ω∗) ;ω∗) holds, only if EFii , E∗−i are com-
patible at the state ω∗, and EFii ∩E∗−i = {ω˜} where ω˜ is some state different
21Note ω∗ ∈ EFii , and
vi
(
EFii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗
)
:= min
E
F−i
−i ∈F−i;
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
EFii , E
F−i
−i ;ω
′)} ≤ min
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
EFii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′)
;ω
′)}
≤ vi
(
EFii , E
F−i
−i (ω
∗) ;ω∗
)
= ui (xi (ω
∗) ;ω∗) ,
imply that we must have equality throughout.
22Since by the definition of a minimum, we have that
min
E
F−i
−i ∈F−i;
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
E˜Fii , E
F−i
−i ;ω
′)} ≤ min
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
E˜Fii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′)
;ω
′)}
.
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from ω∗. This implies that we must have
vi
(
EFii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) = ui (ei (ω∗) + xi (ω˜)− ei (ω˜) ;ω∗)
= ui (xi (ω˜) ;ω
∗) = ui (xi (ω˜) ; ω˜) (1.11)
(recall that both the endowment ei and the utility function ui are Fi-measurable).
Now ω˜ ∈ EFii and the equation (1.11) together imply that
vi
(
EFii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) = min
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
EFii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
. (1.12)
It follows from (1.7) that
vi
(
EFii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) < min
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
E˜Fii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
. (1.13)
Combining (1.12) and (1.13), it follows that
min
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
EFii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
< min
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
E˜Fii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
.
(1.14)
By Lemma 1 in the Appendix, if (1.14) holds, then x fails to be an ex-ante
maximin efficient allocation, a contradiction.
Therefore, we conclude that the mechanism Γ has a truth telling maximin
equilibrium, i.e., sT ∈ME (Γ).
We now show that the truth telling maximin equilibrium is the only max-
imin equilibrium of the mechanism Γ, i.e.,
{
sT
}
= ME (Γ). So suppose
otherwise, that is, suppose both sT and s∗ are maximin equilibria of the
mechanism Γ, and sT 6= s∗.
The truth telling strategy profile sT is different from the strategy profile
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s∗, implies that there must exist a player i and an event EFii , such that
sTi
(
EFii
)
= EFii 6= E˜Fii = s∗i
(
EFii
)
. (1.15)
But s∗i
(
EFii
)
= E˜Fii 6= EFii holds, only if lying makes player i strictly
better off upon observing the event EFii , i.e.,
min
E
F−i
−i ∈F−i;
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
EFii , E
F−i
−i ;ω
′
)}
< min
E
F−i
−i ∈F−i;
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
E˜Fii , E
F−i
−i ;ω
′
)}
,
a contradiction to the fact that the truth telling strategy profile constitutes
a maximin equilibrium of the mechanism.
Clearly, the individually rational and ex-ante maximin efficient allocation
x is implemented. Indeed, under the truth telling strategy profile sT , the list
of reports associated to each state ω is
sT (ω) =
(
EF11 (ω) , · · · , EFNN (ω)
)
.
That is, the players always tell the truth. As a consequence, we have
gi
(
sT (ω) , ω
)
= gi
((
EF11 (ω) , · · · , EFNN (ω)
)
, ω
)
= ei (ω) +Di
(
x− e, (EF11 (ω) , · · · , EFNN (ω)) , ω)
= ei (ω) + xi (ω)− ei (ω) = xi (ω) ,
for each ω ∈ Ω and for each i ∈ I – the requirement of definition 17.
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1.5 Concluding remarks
We showed that each individually rational and ex-ante maximin efficient al-
location is implementable by means of noncooperative behavior under ambi-
guity. That is, given any arbitrary individually rational and ex-ante maximin
efficient allocation, its corresponding direct revelation mechanism yields the
allocation as its unique maximin equilibrium outcome. As a consequence,
each maximin core allocation and each maximin value allocation is imple-
mentable.
The new equilibrium notion (maximin equilibrium) takes into account the
agents’ information constraints – the inability to assign a probability to every
state of nature, and to each possible action of his opponents. In a maximin
equilibrium, each agent maximizes his payoff lowest bound, i.e., each agent
maximizes the payoff that takes into account the worst actions of all the
other agents against him and also the worst state that can occur. It turns
out that, such a noncooperative behavior (i.e., the maximin equilibrium)
enables agents to reach a desirable outcome, i.e., an individual rational and
ex-ante maximin efficient allocation, which is also incentive compatible.
Indeed, the maximin equilibrium solution concept does not assume the
players to know the strategies of their opponents. But even if the players
know the maximin equilibrium strategies of the other players, it is still opti-
mal for them to report the truth (see Lemma 1).
Interestingly, our counter example (Example 3) in Section 1.4.3 shows that,
the Bayesian Nash solution concept fails. In particular, the Bayesian Nash
solution concept does not predict truth telling, contrary to the maximin
equilibrium solution concept. This further highlights the disagreements in
predictions, created by assuming the agents know more than what they ac-
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tually know, as originally demonstrated in the Ellsberg’s experiment [13].
It is an open question whether or not the result of this chapter holds in the
presence of infinitely many states. The difficulty arises from the fact that the
minimum of the utility over even countably many states may not exist. Also,
the implementation of interim efficient notions seem to be an open question.
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1.6 Appendix
Lemma 1. Given a direct revelation mechanism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I ,
{ui}i∈I
〉
, if the allocation x is individually rational and ex-ante maximin
efficient, then there does not exist a player i, an event EFii , and a lie E˜
Fi
i ∈ Fi
(clearly, E˜Fii 6= EFii ), such that 24
min
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
EFii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
< min
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
E˜Fii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
.
(1.16)
Proof. Suppose that there exist a player i, an event EFii , and a lie E˜
Fi
i 6= EFii ,
such that (1.16) holds. We will show that the feasible allocation x fails to be
ex-ante efficient under the maximin preferences – an idea similar to the one
in theorem 4.1 of de Castro-Yannelis [9].
Note, for each ω
′ ∈ EFii , we have
vi
(
EFii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)
= ui
(
xi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)
,
23Some progress in this direction was made in Liu [27], who has shown that the maximin
rational expectations equilibrium is implementable as a maximin equilibrium.
24In words, (1.16) says that if all the other players are truthful, then player i can insure
a higher lower bound payoff by lying under the event EFii .
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and therefore, the LHS of (1.16) can be rewritten as
min
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
EFii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
= min
ω′∈EFii
{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
.
Define an i-allocation of player i, zi (·), such that for each ω′ ∈ EFii ,
vi
(
E˜Fii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)
= ui
(
zi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)
,
and therefore, the RHS of (1.16) can be rewritten as
min
ω′∈EFii
{
vi
(
E˜Fii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
= min
ω′∈EFii
{
ui
(
zi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
.
It follows from (1.16) that
min
ω′∈EFii
{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
< min
ω′∈EFii
{
ui
(
zi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
, (1.17)
which then implies that,
for each ω
′ ∈ arg min
ω′′∈EFii
{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′′
)
;ω
′′
)}
,
we have ui
(
xi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)
< ui
(
zi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)
. (1.18)
For (1.18) to hold, it must be the case that for each ω
′ ∈ arg min
ω′′∈EFii{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′′)
;ω
′′)}
, there exists a state ω˜, such that
1. E˜Fii ∩ EF−i−i
(
ω
′)
= {ω˜},
2. E˜Fii , E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′)
are compatible at ω
′
, and
3. zi
(
ω
′)
= ei
(
ω
′)
+ xi (ω˜)− ei (ω˜) 6= xi
(
ω
′)
.
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Let
{
ω
′
, ω˜
}
denote a set, containing a state ω
′ ∈ arg min
ω′′∈EFii
{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′′)
;
ω
′′)}
and its corresponding25 ω˜. It follows by 1 above that, for each
ω
′ ∈ arg min
ω′′∈EFii
{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′′
)
;ω
′′
)}
,
the set
{
ω
′
, ω˜
}
is a subset of E
F−i
−i
(
ω
′)
.
Now, we are ready to define an allocation y that Pareto improves x under
the maximin preferences. Define for each j ∈ I, the j-allocation yj (·) by
yj(ω
′
) =
 zj
(
ω
′)
if ω
′ ∈ arg min
ω′′∈EFii
{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′′)
;ω
′′)}
xj
(
ω
′)
otherwise,
where zj
(
ω
′)
= ej
(
ω
′)
+ xj (ω˜) − ej (ω˜). Notice that the allocation y is
feasible.
Indeed, for a state ω
′
/∈ arg min
ω′′∈EFii
{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′′)
;ω
′′)}
, we have
∑
j∈I
yj
(
ω
′
)
=
∑
j∈I
xj
(
ω
′
)
=
∑
j∈I
ej
(
ω
′
)
;
and for a state ω
′ ∈ arg min
ω′′∈EFii
{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′′)
;ω
′′)}
, we have
∑
j∈I
yj
(
ω
′
)
=
∑
j∈I
zj
(
ω
′
)
=
∑
j∈I
ej
(
ω
′
)
+
∑
j∈I
xj (ω˜)−
∑
j∈I
ej (ω˜) =
∑
j∈I
ej
(
ω
′
)
(recall that x is a feasible allocation at the state ω˜).
From (1.18) and the definition of yi, we have
min
ω′∈EFii
{
ui
(
yi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
> min
ω′∈EFii
{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
(1.19)
25To avoid confusion, it is worthwhile to re-emphasize that different ω
′ ∈
arg min
ω′′∈EFii
{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′′
)
;ω
′′
)}
may be matched with a different ω˜.
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under the event EFii ; and for any other event Eˆ
Fi
i ∈ Fi, we have
min
ω′∈EˆFii
{
ui
(
yi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
= min
ω′∈EˆFii
{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
.
Therefore, combined with the assumption on µi (·) (Assumption 2), we con-
clude that, for the player i,
∑
Ei∈Fi
(
min
ω′∈Ei
ui
(
yi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
))
µi (Ei) >
∑
Ei∈Fi
(
min
ω′∈Ei
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
))
µi (Ei) .
(1.20)
Here we abuse the notations in (1.20) slightly, in particular, Ei denotes an
arbitrary event in Fi. That is, player i strictly prefers the i-allocation yi to
the i-allocation xi under the maximin preferences. Now, it remains to show
that for any other player k 6= i, we have yk is preferred to xk under the
maximin preferences.
Fix an arbitrary player k 6= i, and an arbitrary event that player k may
observe, EFkk ∈ Fk. Notice, if the event EFkk contains a state
ω
′ ∈ arg min
ω
′′∈EFii
{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′′
)
;ω
′′
)}
,
then it contains the set
{
ω
′
, ω˜
}
. So, by the Fk-measurability of ek, we have
zk
(
ω
′)
= ek
(
ω
′)
+ xk (ω˜) − ek (ω˜) = xk (ω˜). Now, for the event EFkk , define
Xk =
{
xk
(
ω
′)
: ω
′ ∈ EFkk
}
and Yk =
{
yk
(
ω
′)
: ω
′ ∈ EFkk
}
. We have Yk ⊂
Xk. Indeed, if ω
′ ∈ EFkk and ω
′ ∈ arg min
ω′′∈EFii
{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′′)
;ω
′′)}
, then
yk
(
ω
′
)
= zk
(
ω
′
)
= xk (ω˜) ∈ Xk;
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and if ω
′ ∈ EFkk and ω
′
/∈ arg min
ω′′∈EFii
{
ui
(
xi
(
ω
′′)
;ω
′′)}
, then
yk
(
ω
′
)
= xk
(
ω
′
)
∈ Xk.
Therefore, with Assumption 4, we have that
min
ω′∈EFkk
{
uk
(
yk
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
≥ min
ω′∈EFkk
{
uk
(
xk
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
)}
.
Since the event EFkk ∈ Fk is arbitrary, we conclude that
∑
E
Fk
k ∈Fk
(
min
ω′∈EFkk
uk
(
yk
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
))
µk
(
EFkk
)
≥
∑
E
Fk
k ∈Fk
(
min
ω′∈EFkk
uk
(
xk
(
ω
′
)
;ω
′
))
µk
(
EFkk
)
.
Also, since player k 6= i is arbitrary, we have for every player k 6= i, yk is
preferred to xk under the maximin preferences.
Thus, the allocation y Pareto improves the allocation x under the maximin
preferences, i.e., x fails to be an ex-ante maximin efficient allocation. This
contradiction completes the proof of Lemma 1.
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CHAPTER 2
A NOTE ON THE WELFARE OF THE
MAXIMIN RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
2.1 Introduction
The interest of the maximin preferences of Gilboa-Schmeidler [14], comes
in that they take care of the cases where agents have difficulties to form a
single prior. As a consequence, the Ellsberg paradox is resolved (de Castro-
Yannelis [10]). Also, under the maximin preferences, the conflict between
efficiency and incentive compatibility ceases to exist (de Castro-Yannelis [9]).
That is, under the maximin preferences all (first-best) efficient allocations are
incentive compatible. Furthermore, de Castro-Yannelis [9] show that only
maximin preferences have this property in general.
The introduction of the maximin preferences into the general equilibrium
modeling1, enables us to have a rational expectations equilibrium notion
that performs better than its Bayesian counterpart. Specifically, de Castro,
Pesce and Yannelis [12] show that the rational expectations equilibrium un-
der maximin preferences (MREE) exists universally. The standard Bayesian
rational expectations (REE) notion, however, exists generically (see Radner
[29] and Allen [1]). Indeed, in the Kreps [22] example, a REE does not exist.
However, de Castro, Pesce and Yannelis [12] show that in the same exam-
1For other applications of introducing the maximin preferences into the general equilib-
rium modeling, see Condie and Ganguli [4], Correia-da-Silva and Herves-Beloso [5], Dana
[6], de Castro and Chateauneuf [8], and de Castro, Pesce and Yannelis [11], just to name
a few.
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ple a MREE exists, it is unique and interim efficient. Furthermore, Liu [27]
shows that this MREE allocation is maximin Nash incentive compatible and
implementable.
In this note, we study the ex-ante welfare of the MREE notion2. We show
that the MREE, which is interim efficient under the maximin preferences (de
Castro, Pesce and Yannelis [12]), may not be ex-ante efficient. In particular,
we show that there can be ex-ante welfare improvement switching from a
MREE allocation to an alternative feasible, maximin Nash incentive com-
patible and implementable allocation. As a consequence, a maximin rational
expectations equilibrium allocation may not be in the maximin core. That
is, when deciding on an ex-ante insurance contract, a MREE allocation may
not be a good candidate.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Sections 2.2 and 2.3 we define
an asymmetric information economy and the ex-ante efficiency notion. In
Section 2.4 we present the counterexample to the ex-ante efficiency of the
maximin rational expectations notion. Finally, we conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 Asymmetric information economy
Let Ω denote a finite set of states of nature, ω ∈ Ω a state of nature, R`+ the
` good commodity space, and I the set of N agents, i.e., I = {1, . . . , N}. An
asymmetric information economy E is a set E = {Ω; (Fi, µi, ei, ui) : i ∈ I}.
Each element of the economy is common knowledge, unless specified other-
wise. For each i ∈ I, Fi is a partition of Ω. Let EFii ∈ Fi denote an event,
and ω ∈ EFii a state in the event. Then, in the interim, if state ω occurs,
agent i observes the event EFii , which is his private information. µi denotes
2Glycopantis and Yannelis [18] did the welfare analysis for the REE notion. They show
that a REE may not be (pooled/full information) interim or ex-ante efficient.
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agent i’s prior. It is defined on events that are no finer than the ones in his
information partition, that is, µi : σ (Fi) → [0, 1], where σ (Fi) denotes the
algebra generated by the partition Fi. Note, if EFii = {ω, ω′}, then the prob-
ability of the event EFii is well defined, but not the probability of the event
{ω} or {ω′}. The incompleteness of his prior is common knowledge, but the
prior is his private information3. ei : Ω → R`+ is agent i’s random initial
endowment. Finally, ui : R`+ × Ω → R is agent i’s ex post utility function,
taking the form of ui (ci;ω), where ci denotes agent i’s consumption.
Let xi : Ω→ R`+ denote agent i’s allocation (or in short, i-allocation). De-
note by L the set of all possible allocations of agent i, and by x = (x1, . . . , xN)
an allocation of the above economy E . An allocation x is said to be feasible,
if for each ω ∈ Ω, ∑i∈I xi (ω) = ∑i∈I ei (ω).
In the interim, a state of nature ω is realized, agent i observes the event
EFii (ω). He may even be able to refine his information to a smaller set,
EGii (ω) ⊆ EFii (ω), with the help of some public information revealed in the
interim. Clearly, if no public information is released in the interim, or if
the public information reveals less than what agent i knows, then EGii (ω) =
EFii (ω).
An agent, who observes a non-singleton event in the interim, cannot form
a probability assessment over the states of the nature in the event. This is
due to the incompleteness of the private prior.
Following de Castro-Yannelis [9], agents have maximin preferences, as ax-
iomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler [14]. That is, in the event EGii , agent i
prefers the i-allocation fi to the i-allocation hi under the maximin preferences
if
3It is common knowledge that the agents do not have interim probability.
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min
ω′∈EGii
ui (fi (ω
′) ;ω′) ≥ min
ω′∈EGii
ui (hi (ω
′) ;ω′) . (2.1)
Furthermore, under the maximin preferences, we say agent i prefers fi to
hi ex-ante if
∑
E
Fi
i ∈Fi
(
min
ω∈EFii
ui (fi (ω) ;ω)
)
µi
(
EFii
) ≥ ∑
E
Fi
i ∈Fi
(
min
ω∈EFii
ui (hi (ω) ;ω)
)
µi
(
EFii
)
.
(2.2)
Agent i strictly prefers fi to hi, if he prefers fi to hi, but not the reverse.
2.3 Ex-ante efficiency
We define the notion of the maximin core (see Liu and Yannelis [25]).
Definition 21. A maximin core allocation is a feasible allocation x = (xi)i∈I
for which there is no coalition C ⊆ I, C 6= ∅, and an allocation of the coalition
(yi)i∈C satisfying for all ω ∈ Ω,
∑
i∈C yi (ω) =
∑
i∈C ei (ω), for all i ∈ C, yi
is preferred to xi ex-ante under the maximin preferences, and for at least one
i ∈ C, yi is strictly preferred to xi.
When the coalition is the grand coalition, i.e., C = I, we have the ex-ante
maximin efficiency notion. That is,
Definition 22. A feasible allocation x = (xi)i∈I is said to be ex-ante maximin
efficient, if there does not exist another feasible allocation y = (yi)i∈I , such
that for all i ∈ I, yi is preferred to xi ex-ante under the maximin preferences,
and for at least one i ∈ I, yi is strictly preferred to xi.
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2.4 Maximin rational expectations equilibrium
(MREE)
We explore the ex-ante efficiency of the maximin rational expectations equi-
librium notion (MREE). The MREE notion of de Castro, Pesce and Yannelis
[12] is an interim solution concept. According to it, each agent chooses his
consumption to maximize his interim payoff, taking into account both his
private information and the information generated by the equilibrium prices.
Here, unlike the standard rational expectations equilibrium notion of Radner
[29] and Allen [1], the agents face ambiguity and have ambiguity aversion in
the form of the maximin preferences.
Before stating the formal definitions, it is useful to introduce some nota-
tions.
A price vector p is a non-zero function from Ω to R`+. In a rational expec-
tations equilibrium, agent i’s interim information results from integrating his
private information, EFii (ω), with the public information revealed through
prices, p (ω), where ω denotes the realized state.
Now, we describe Gi, the set of possible interim information for agent
i. Let σ (p) denote the smallest algebra for which p is measurable, and
σ (Gi) := σ (Fi) ∨ σ (p), the smallest algebra containing both σ (Fi) and
σ (p), in which Gi is the partition of Ω that generates σ (Gi). In the interim,
agent i observes an event EGii (ω) in Gi.
Finally, given a price vector p, let Bi (p;ω) denote agent i’s interim budget
set when the realized state is ω,
Bi (p;ω) :=
{
yi : Ω→ R`+ | yi (ω′) · p (ω′) ≤ ei (ω′) · p (ω′) ,∀ω′ ∈ EGii (ω)
}
.
Definition 23. A price vector p and an allocation x constitute a maximin
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rational expectations equilibrium (MREE) for the economy E if:
1. for each i ∈ I and for each ω ∈ Ω, xi (ω) · p (ω) ≤ ei (ω) · p (ω);
2. for each i ∈ I and for each ω ∈ Ω,
min
ω′∈EGii (ω)
ui (xi (ω
′) ;ω′) ≥ min
ω′∈EGii (ω)
ui (yi (ω
′) ;ω′) , for all yi ∈ Bi (p;ω) ;
3. and for each ω ∈ Ω,
∑
i∈I
xi (ω) =
∑
i∈I
ei (ω) .
De Castro, Pesce and Yannelis [12] show that each MREE allocation is
interim maximin efficient. We show that, for a MREE, there is room for
improvement ex-ante.
Proposition 1. A MREE allocation may not be ex-ante maximin efficient.
The example below is a modified version of the example 5.1 of Hahn and
Yannelis [19].
Example 5. There are two agents, I = {1, 2}, two goods, and
three states of nature Ω = {a, b, c}. The ex post utility function of
each agent i ∈ I is ui (xi,1 (ω) , xi,2 (ω) ;ω) =
√
xi,1 (ω) · xi,2 (ω),
ω ∈ Ω, where the second index refers to the good. The agents’
random initial endowments, information partitions and private
priors are:
(e1 (a) , e1 (b) , e1 (c)) = ((7, 1) , (7, 1) , (4, 1));
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(e2 (a) , e2 (b) , e2 (c)) = ((1, 10) , (1, 7) , (1, 7));
F1 = {{a, b} , {c}}; F2 = {{a} , {b, c}}
µ1 ({a, b}) = 23 ; µ1 ({c}) = 13
µ2 ({a}) = 13 ; µ2 ({b, c}) = 23
This economy has a fully revealing MREE. The price p and the
allocation x are:
In state a, (p1 (a) , p2 (a)) =
(
1, 8
11
)
; x1,1 (a) =
85
22
, x1,2 (a) =
85
16
,
x2,1 (a) =
91
22
, x2,2 (a) =
91
16
.
In state b, (p1 (b) , p2 (b)) = (1, 1); x1,1 (b) = 4, x1,2 (b) = 4,
x2,1 (b) = 4, x2,2 (b) = 4.
In state c, (p1 (c) , p2 (c)) =
(
1, 5
8
)
; x1,1 (c) =
37
16
, x1,2 (c) =
37
10
,
x2,1 (c) =
43
16
, x2,2 (c) =
43
10
.
Now, we shift some good 1 and good 2 from agent 1 to agent
2 under the state a, and define a new allocation y. Like the
allocation x, the new allocation y is meaningful. That is, both x
and y are maximin Nash incentive compatible and implementable
in the sense of Liu [27].
At state a, y1,1 (a) =
80
22
, y1,2 (a) =
80
16
, y2,1 (a) =
96
22
, y2,2 (a) =
96
16
.
At state b, y1,1 (b) = 4, y1,2 (b) = 4, y2,1 (b) = 4, y2,2 (b) = 4.
At state c, y1,1 (c) =
37
16
, y1,2 (c) =
37
10
, y2,1 (c) =
43
16
, y2,2 (c) =
43
10
.
Clearly, the allocation y is feasible. Comparing with x, the al-
location y gives agent 2 strictly higher ex-ante maximin utility,
without hurting the agent 1.
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Indeed, agent 2’s ex-ante maximin utility under the allocation y
1
3
·
√
96
22
· 96
16
+
2
3
·min
{√
4 · 4,
√
43
16
· 43
10
}
= 3.97
is strictly higher than his ex-ante maximin utility under the allo-
cation x
1
3
·
√
91
22
· 91
16
+
2
3
·min
{√
4 · 4,
√
43
16
· 43
10
}
= 3.88.
While for agent 1, his ex-ante maximin utility under the alloca-
tions y and x are the same
2
3
·min
{√
80
22
· 80
16
,
√
4 · 4
}
+
1
3
·
√
37
16
· 37
10
=
2
3
·min
{√
85
22
· 85
16
,
√
4 · 4
}
+
1
3
·
√
37
16
· 37
10
.
Consequently, the MREE allocation x fails to be ex-ante maximin
efficient.
Corollary 2. A MREE allocation is not necessarily in the maximin core.
By definition, each maximin core allocation is ex-ante maximin efficient.
Since a MREE allocation may not be ex-ante maximin efficient, a fortiori it
may not belong to the maximin core.
2.5 Concluding remarks
We showed that a MREE allocation may fail to be ex-ante maximin efficient,
and therefore may not be in the maximin core. That is, the MREE allocations
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may not be good candidates for ex-ante insurance contracts. It is possible
to improve the ex-ante welfare by switching from a MREE allocation to an
alternative feasible, maximin Nash incentive compatible and implementable
allocation.
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
MAXIMIN RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
EQUILIBRIUM ALLOCATIONS
3.1 Introduction
The interest of the maximin rational expectations equilibrium (MREE), a
notion introduced by de Castro, Pesce and Yannelis [12], arises from that it
has better general equilibrium properties than the standard Bayesian ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium (REE) (Radner [29]). In particular, the MREE
notion is able to give us insights about market equilibrium, when the REE
notion fails. More specifically, de Castro, Pesce and Yannelis [12] show that
the MREE exists universally, under the standard monotonicity and concav-
ity assumptions of the ex post utility function. The REE, however, exists
generically, see Radner [29] and Allen [1]. Indeed, in the Kreps [22] example,
a REE does not exist. However, de Castro, Pesce and Yannelis [12] show
that in the same example (i.e., Kreps) a MREE exists and it is unique and it
is interim efficient. In terms of efficiency, they [12] show that each MREE is
interim efficient. This result does not hold for the REE (See Glycopantis and
Yannelis [18]). Furthermore, the REE may not be incentive compatible or
implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game
(Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis [16] [17]). De Castro, Pesce and Yannelis
[12] show that each MREE is incentive compatible. The implementation of
the MREE is yet to be explored.
In this chapter, we study the implementation of the MREE. The term
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implementation is used in the sense of realization of an allocation, as in
Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis [15] [16] [17]. The non-triviality comes from
that, a MREE allocation may not be interim information measurable. That
is, an agent’s equilibrium consumption bundle may differ at the states that
he cannot distinguish. As a consequence, an agent may not know what to do
to end up with the equilibrium consumption. Could the agents reach such
an allocation non-cooperatively? When an agent is better informed, would
he have an incentive to lie?
More specifically, we study the problem of implementation with the help of
a simultaneous move direct revelation mechanism. Pick a MREE allocation,
the mechanism is a game, in which the agents simultaneously report their
interim information. The payoff rules are the same as in Glycopantis et. al.
[15]. Since lies may not be detected, there is no guarantee that the agents
will end up with the pre-picked MREE allocation. However, if they do, then
we say that the MREE allocation is implementable.
In view of the maximin preferences under which the MREE is defined, we
apply the maximin equilibrium notion of Liu and Yannelis [25] to the mech-
anism. Roughly speaking, in a maximin equilibrium, each agent maximizes
his payoff lowest bound, that is, each agent simply maximizes the payoff that
takes into account the worst actions of all the other agents against him and
also the worst state that can occur.
We say a MREE allocation is implementable through its corresponding
direct revelation mechanism as a maximin equilibrium, if the MREE allo-
cation is realized through each maximin equilibrium of the mechanism. We
also introduce a notion of maximin Nash incentive compatibility (MNIC),
which says that an allocation is incentive compatible, if each agent prefers
his allocation to any alternative allocation that he can get by lying, while
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perceiving others as truthful.
We show that each MREE allocation is maximin Nash incentive compati-
ble. Each fully revealing MREE is implementable. Each partially revealing
MREE is implementable, provided that the agents’ ex post utility functions
are private information measurable. That is, we need the agents to know
their utility functions in the interim stage – a standard assumption in games
with incomplete information. Finally, the non-revealing MREEs are harder
to implement, in the sense that we need to impose more condition on the
economy to guarantee the implementation.
The chapter is organized as follows. In sections 3.2 and 3.3 we define
an asymmetric information economy, and the maximin rational expectations
equilibrium notion. In section 3.4 we introduce the simultaneous move direct
revelation mechanism. In section 3.5 we show that each maximin rational
expectations equilibrium allocation is MNIC. In section 3.6 we characterize
the conditions, under which each maximin rational expectations equilibrium
is implementable as a maximin equilibrium. Finally, we conclude in section
3.7.
3.2 Asymmetric information economy
We consider an exchange economy with asymmetric information and ambigu-
ity averse individuals. Formally, let Ω denote a finite set of states of nature,
ω ∈ Ω a state of nature, R`+ the ` good commodity space, and I the set of
N agents, i.e., I = {1, . . . , N}.
An asymmetric information economy is a set E = {Ω; (Fi, ei, ui) : i ∈ I}.
Each element of the economy is common knowledge. Fi is a partition of Ω.
Let EFii (ω) denote the event in the partition Fi that contains the state ω.
59
If the state ω occurs, agent i observes the event EFii (ω), which is his private
information. Also, we impose the standard assumption that when a state
occurs, and all the agents truthfully report their private information, they
will know the realized state1. That is,
Assumption 5. For each ω,
⋂
j∈I E
Fj
j (ω) = {ω}.
ei : Ω → R`+ is agent i’s random initial endowment. We require ei to be
Fi - measurable2, so that the information partition Fi contains all possible
private information of agent i. Finally, ui : R`+ × Ω → R is agent i’s ex
post utility function, taking the form of ui (ci;ω), where ci denotes agent i’s
consumption.
Agent i’s allocation (or in short, i-allocation) specifies his consumption
bundle at each state of nature, i.e., xi : Ω → R`+. Let Li denote the set of
all possible allocations of agent i, and x = (x1, . . . , xN) an allocation of the
above economy E . An allocation x is said to be feasible, if for each ω ∈ Ω,∑
i∈I xi (ω) =
∑
i∈I ei (ω).
In the interim, a state of nature ω is realized, agent i observes the event
EFii (ω). He may even be able to refine his information to a smaller set,
EGii (ω) ⊆ EFii (ω), with the help of some public information revealed in the
interim. Clearly, if no public information is released in the interim, or if the
public information reveals less than what agent i knows, then Gi = Fi.
Following de Castro et. al. [12], we postulate that the agents have the
maximin preferences, a case of Gilboa and Schmeidler [14].
1This assumption is without loss of generality, since if there exist two different states
ω and ω′, such that no agent is able to distinguish them, then the two states may as well
be treated as one state.
2That is, ei is constant on each element of Fi. More precisely, let Fi be agent i’s
partition, and fix any ωk ∈ Ω. If ei : Ω→ R`+ is Fi - measurable, then ei (ω) = ei (ωk) for
any ω ∈ EFii (ωk).
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Assumption 6. In the event EGii , agent i prefers the i-allocation fi to the
i-allocation hi under the maximin preferences, if
min
ω′∈EGii
ui (fi (ω
′) ;ω′) ≥ min
ω′∈EGii
ui (hi (ω
′) ;ω′) . (3.1)
3.3 Maximin rational expectations equilibrium
(MREE)
The maximin rational expectations equilibrium (MREE) of de Castro, Pesce
and Yannelis [12] is an interim solution concept. According to it, each agent
chooses his consumption to maximize his interim maximin payoff, taking into
account both his private information and the information generated by the
equilibrium prices.
A price vector p is a non-zero function from Ω to R`+. In a MREE, each
agent i’s interim information is his private information EFii (ω) refined by the
public information revealed through the prices, p (ω), where ω denotes the
realized state.
To fix the idea, consider a very simple example, in which the state space
Ω = {a, b, c}, and agent i’s information partition Fi = {{a, b} , {c}}. Also,
the MREE price vector takes the form of p (a) = p (c) = q, p (b) = q, where
q, q ∈ R`++ and q 6= q. Then, in the MREE, if the realized state is a,
agent i knows exactly so. Indeed, he observes the event {a, b} from nature,
and the prices q. From these information, he can infer that state a is the
realized state. It turns out that in this particular MREE, agent i has com-
plete information in the interim, since his all possible interim information is
{{a} , {b} , {c}}.
Now, we formalize agent i’s all possible interim information. Let σ (p)
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denote the smallest algebra for which p is measurable, and σ (Gi) := σ (Fi)∨
σ (p), the smallest algebra containing both σ (Fi) and σ (p), in which Gi
denotes the partition of Ω that generates σ (Gi). Then, the set Gi is the set
that contains all possible interim information of agent i.
Finally, given a price vector p, let Bi (p;ω) denote agent i’s interim budget
set when the realized state is ω, then
Bi (p;ω) :=
{
yi : Ω→ R`+ | yi (ω′) · p (ω′) ≤ ei (ω′) · p (ω′) ,∀ω′ ∈ EGii (ω)
}
.
Definition 24. A price vector p and an allocation x constitute a maximin
rational expectations equilibrium (MREE) for the economy E if:
1. for each i ∈ I and for each ω ∈ Ω, xi (ω) · p (ω) ≤ ei (ω) · p (ω);
2. for each i ∈ I and for each ω ∈ Ω,
min
ω′∈EGii (ω)
ui (xi (ω
′) ;ω′) ≥ min
ω′∈EGii (ω)
ui (yi (ω
′) ;ω′) , for all yi ∈ Bi (p;ω) ;
3. and for each ω ∈ Ω,
∑
i∈I
xi (ω) =
∑
i∈I
ei (ω) .
A MREE is non-revealing, if σ (p) = {Ω, ∅}. A MREE is fully revealing, if
σ (p) = 2Ω. Otherwise, it is said to be partially revealing.
Remark 4. Liu [26] shows that the set of MREE allocations is not a subset
of the ex ante maximin core. Consequently, the implementation result of Liu
and Yannelis [25] does not apply here.
We examine if agents can reach a maximin rational expectations equilib-
rium allocation? More specifically, is each maximin rational expectations
62
equilibrium allocation implementable? We study this question with the help
of a simultaneous move direct revelation mechanism.
3.4 Direct revelation mechanisms
A direct revelation mechanism, associated with an allocation and its under-
lying asymmetric information economy, is a non-cooperative game.
In the interim, a state of nature ω is realize. Each player i receives the
initial endowment ei (ω), and holds the possibly refined private information
(his interim information) EGii (ω). Then, each player i strategically writes
down his report EGii ∈ Gi on a piece of paper and puts it in a sealed envelope.
The report EGii , however, may or may not be truthful. That is, for player i,
the reported event EGii may be different from the observed event E
Gi
i (ω).
Definition 25. Let ω denote the realized state. A report of player i, EGii ∈ Gi,
is a lie, if it differs from the event EGii (ω).
Then, all the envelopes are opened at the same time. Based on the players’
reports, redistribution takes place. We adopt the pay out rule of Glycopantis,
Muir and Yannelis [15]. A planned redistribution is the adjustments needed
to go from the initial endowment e to a planned allocation x.
Definition 26. If x is the planned allocation, then the planned redistribution
(net transfer) is given by x− e.
The actual redistribution, on the other hand, depends on the planned redis-
tribution, the players’ reports EG11 , . . . , E
GN
N , and the realized state of nature
ω. Assumption 5 implies that for any collection of reports EG11 , . . . , E
GN
N , the⋂
i∈I E
Gi
i is either singleton or empty
3. Clearly, for the reports to be compat-
ible, they must not contradict with each other. Yet, this requirement is not
3Indeed, given any collection of reports EG11 , . . . , E
GiN
N , there is a corresponding list
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sufficient. We also need every player to have enough endowment to carry out
the planned redistribution. More precisely,
Definition 27. We say the reports EG11 , . . . , E
GN
N are compatible at the state
ω, if
1.
⋂
i∈I E
Gi
i = {ω˜}, and
2. ei (ω) + (xi (ω˜)− ei (ω˜)) ∈ R`+ for all i ∈ I.
Furthermore, we refer the state ω˜ as the implied state (the agreed state).
When the reports EG11 , . . . , E
GN
N are compatible at the realized state ω,
no player has reason to believe that someone has lied. They end up with
e (ω) + x (ω˜) − e (ω˜), where ω˜ is the implied state, and x (ω˜) − e (ω˜) is the
planned redistribution specified for the state ω˜. Clearly, if all the players
tell the truth, then ω˜ = ω and the players get what they planned to get,
e (ω) + x (ω)− e (ω) = x (ω). But, since some player may successfully lie, ω˜
may not be the true state. As a consequence, e (ω) +x (ω˜)− e (ω˜) may differ
from x (ω), i.e., the players may not end up with the planned allocation. If
the reports are not compatible at the realized state ω, there is no trade, i.e.,
the players keep their initial endowments.
Definition 28. Let x−e denote a planned redistribution and (EG11 , . . . , EGNN )
a list of reports. Then the actual redistribution is given by
D
(
x− e, (EG11 , . . . , EGNN )) =
 x (ω˜)− e (ω˜) if the reports are compatible0 otherwise;
of events EF11 , . . . , E
FN
N , such that, for each i, E
Gi
i ⊆ EFii . Consequently,
⋂
i∈I E
Gi
i ⊆⋂
i∈I E
Fi
i . But since, by Assumption 5, for any collection of events E
F1
1 , . . . , E
FN
N , the⋂
i∈I E
Fi
i is either singleton or empty, so will
⋂
i∈I E
Gi
i be.
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where ω˜ denotes the implied state and Di
(
x− e, (EG11 , . . . , EGNN )) denotes
the amount that player i gives to or takes from the others.
Definition 29. A strategy of player i is a function, si : Gi → Gi.
In words, player i’s strategy is a complete plan of reports, that specifies a
report for the player conditional on each possible information he might hold.
Let Si denote player i’s strategy set – the collection of all possible strategies
of player i, S := ×i∈ISi the strategy set, and s ∈ S a strategy profile.
Furthermore, with a slightly abused notation, we use s (ω) to denote the
players’ reports, when they adopt the strategy profile s, and the realized
state is ω. That is, s (ω) :=
(
s1
(
EG11 (ω)
)
, . . . , sN
(
EGNN (ω)
))
. Clearly, for
any ω ∈ Ω, s (ω) ∈ ×i∈IGi.
Definition 30. A direct revelation mechanism, associated with an allocation
x and its underlying asymmetric information economy E = {Ω; (Fi, ei, ui)i∈I},
denoted by Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
is a set, where
1. I = {1, . . . , N} is the set of N players;
2. S is the players’ strategy set; for each s ∈ S, we have si : Gi → Gi for
all i;
3. x− e denotes the planned redistribution;
4. gi : G1 × . . . × GN × Ω → R`+ is the outcome function for player i. It
depends on the reports of all the players
(
EG11 , . . . , E
GN
N
) ∈ G1× . . .×GN
and the realized state of nature ω ∈ Ω. It takes the form of
gi
((
EG11 , . . . , E
GN
N
)
, ω
)
= ei (ω) +Di
(
x− e, (EG11 , . . . , EGNN )) , (3.2)
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where ei (ω) + Di
(
x− e, (EG11 , . . . , EGNN )) is the bundle of the goods,
that player i ends up consuming;
5. and finally, ui : R`+×Ω→ R is player i’s ex post utility function, taking
the form of ui (ci;ω), where ci denotes player i’s consumption. It is as
defined in the economy E.
For convenience, we define, for each player i, a final payoff function. It
tells us the final payoff that player i ends up, given a list of reports and a
realized state of nature. Formally,
Definition 31. Denote by vi : G1 × . . . × GN × Ω → R, vi := ui ◦ gi, the
final payoff function of player i. It depends on the reports of all the players(
EG11 , . . . , E
GN
N
) ∈ G1× . . .×GN and the realized state of nature ω ∈ Ω, taking
the form of
vi
((
EG11 , . . . , E
GN
N
)
;ω
)
= ui
(
gi
((
EG11 , . . . , E
GN
N
)
, ω
)
;ω
)
.
In what follows, we use G−i := ×j 6=iGj to denote the action set of all
the players except player i; E
G−i
−i :=
(
EG11 , . . . , E
Gi−1
i−1 , E
Gi+1
i+1 , . . . , E
GN
N
)
∈ G−i
the reports of all the players expect player i; and s−i (ω) = s−i
(
E
G−i
−i (ω)
)
:=(
s1
(
EG11 (ω)
)
, . . . , si−1
(
E
Gi−1
i−1 (ω)
)
, si+1
(
E
Gi+1
i+1 (ω)
)
, . . . , sN
(
EGNN (ω)
))
the
reports of all the players expect player i, when state ω is realized and the
players act according to the strategy profile s.
Furthermore, we write ω ∈ EG−i−i , if ω belongs to each element in the list(
EG11 , . . . , E
Gi−1
i−1 , E
Gi+1
i+1 , . . . , E
GN
N
)
, and EGii
⋂
E
G−i
−i :=
⋂
j∈I E
Gj
j to denote the
information revealed by the reports of all the players.
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3.5 Maximin Nash incentive compatibility
The notion of maximin Nash incentive compatibility (MNIC) says that an
allocation is incentive compatible, if each player prefers his allocation xi to
any alternative allocation that he can get by lying, while perceiving others
as truthful. The only difference from the standard incentive compatibility
notion is that now we have the maximin preferences.
Definition 32. A feasible allocation x is said to be maximin Nash incentive
compatible (MNIC) with respect to the information structure {Gi}i∈I , if for
each i, and for each EGii ∈ Gi, we have
min
ω′∈EGii
ui (xi (ω
′) ;ω′) = min
ω′∈EGii
vi
(
EGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) ;ω′
)
≥
min
ω′∈EGii
ui
(
gi
(
EˆGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) , ω′
)
;ω′
)
, (3.3)
for all EˆGii ∈ Gi.
Remark 5. One may interpret the MNIC notion as saying that truth telling
is a mutual best response under the maximin preferences4.
This notion is consistent with the maximin preferences, since by the defi-
nition of vi, we can write (3.3) as
min
ω′∈EGii
ui
(
gi
(
EGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) , ω′
)
;ω′
)
≥ min
ω′∈EGii
ui
(
gi
(
EˆGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) , ω′
)
;ω′
)
,
which says that we are applying the maximin preferences to the i-allocations
coming out of the outcome function gi.
Theorem 2. Denote by x the maximin rational expectations equilibrium al-
location at prices p of an asymmetric information economy E. Then, x is
4See also Bose and Renou [3].
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maximin Nash incentive compatible.
Proof. We show that there does not exist a player i, an event EGii , and a lie
EˆGii 6= EGii , such that
min
ω′∈EGii
ui (xi (ω
′) ;ω′) = min
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) ;ω′
)}
< min
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EˆGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) ;ω′
)}
. (3.4)
We proceed by assuming (3.4) holds, and then reach a contradiction by
showing that the feasible and affordable allocation x fails to be a MREE
allocation.
Suppose (3.4) holds, and define an allocation of player i, zi, such that for
each ω′ ∈ EGii ,
vi
(
EˆGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) ;ω′
)
= ui (zi (ω
′) ;ω′) ;
and for each ω′ /∈ EGii , zi (ω′) = xi (ω′).
We will show that the allocation zi ∈ Bi (p, ω), for some ω ∈ EGii . That is,
we want to show for each ω′ ∈ EGii (ω) = EGii , we have
zi (ω
′) · p (ω′) ≤ ei (ω′) · p (ω′) . (3.5)
By the affordability of xi, we have
xi (ω
′) · p (ω′) ≤ ei (ω′) · p (ω′) ,
for each ω′ ∈ Ω, and therefore for each ω′ ∈ EGii ⊆ Ω.
So to show zi ∈ Bi (p, ω), it suffices to show that (3.5) holds for all the
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states at which zi differs from both xi and ei. Let D denote the set of states
of nature, at which the i-allocation zi differs from both the i-allocation xi
and ei. Then, by the definition of zi, we have
D ⊆ C :=
{
ω′ ∈ EGii | EˆGii and EG−i−i (ω′) are compatible at ω′
}
.
It is not hard to see that (3.5) holds for all the states in D. Indeed,
at each ω′ ∈ C, we have, by (3.2), zi (ω′) = ei (ω′) + xi (ω˜) − ei (ω˜), where
{ω˜} = EˆGii ∩EG−i−i (ω′). Furthermore, ω˜ ∈ EG−i−i (ω′) implies that p (ω˜) = p (ω′)
(since for otherwise, the −i players would be able to distinguish the states ω˜
and ω′ in the interim). Therefore, we have
zi (ω
′) · p (ω′) = (ei (ω′) + xi (ω˜)− ei (ω˜)) · p (ω′)
= ei (ω
′) · p (ω′) + xi (ω˜) · p (ω˜)− ei (ω˜) · p (ω˜)
≤ ei (ω′) · p (ω′) ,
by the affordability of xi at the state ω˜, which says xi (ω˜)·p (ω˜) ≤ ei (ω˜)·p (ω˜) .
Moreover, D ⊆ C implies (3.5) holds for each state in D.
Finally, since we can write (3.4) as
min
ω′∈EGii
ui (xi (ω
′) ;ω′) < min
ω′∈EGii
ui (zi (ω
′) ;ω′) , (3.6)
then under the price vector p, the allocation x fails to satisfy the MREE
condition 2. That is, (x, p) fails to be a maximin rational expectations equi-
librium, and this contradiction concludes the proof.
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3.6 Implementation of the MREE
We say an allocation x is implementable, if the allocation x is realized through
each maximin equilibrium (Liu and Yannelis [25]) of the direct revelation
mechanism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
.
Loosely speaking, in a maximin equilibrium, each player maximizes his
payoff lowest bound, that is, each player simply maximizes the payoff that
takes into account the worst actions of all the other players against him and
also the worst state that can occur.
Definition 33. In a simultaneous move direct revelation mechanism Γ, a
strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s
∗
N) constitutes a maximin equilibrium (ME), if
for each player i, his strategy s∗i maximizes his interim payoff lower bound.
That is, for each i, the function s∗i : Gi → Gi satisfies, for each EGii ∈ Gi,
min
E
G−i
−i ∈G−i; ω′∈E
Gi
i
vi
(
s∗i
(
EGii
)
, E
G−i
−i ;ω
′
)
≥ min
E
G−i
−i ∈G−i; ω′∈E
Gi
i
vi
(
EˆGii , E
G−i
−i ;ω
′
)
,
(3.7)
for all EˆGii ∈ Gi.
The maximin equilibrium formulation is consistent with the multiple priors
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [14] and the maximin preferences. Indeed,
here, we assume that in the interim, each player i is uncertain about the
strategy choice of all the other players, and the realized state of nature ω.
That is, the relevant state space for player i is S−i ×EGii (ω). Let Bi denote
player i’s all possible beliefs over this state space, i.e., Bi is the set of all
probability measures defined on the power set of the state space S−i×EGii (ω).
Clearly, the set Bi is non-empty. Also, since the players’ strategy sets and
the set EGii (ω) ⊆ Ω are finite, the set Bi is closed and convex.
Since the players are ambiguity averse, in the interim they choose EGii ∈ Gi
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to maximize
min
pi∈Bi
∑
(s−i,ω′)∈S−i×EGii (ω)
vi
(
EGii , s−i (ω
′) ;ω′
) · pi (s−i, ω′) . (3.8)
Now, since the set Bi contains all possible probability measures, the ob-
jective function (3.8) is equivalent to
min
E
G−i
−i ∈G−i; ω′∈E
Gi
i
vi
(
EGii , E
G−i
−i ;ω
′
)
, (3.9)
which is the formulation used in the maximin equilibrium.
Definition 34. Let x denote an allocation, and ME (Γ) the set of maximin
equilibria of the mechanism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
. We say that
the allocation x is implementable as a maximin equilibrium of the mechanism
Γ, if
for each s∗ ∈ME (Γ) , we have gi (s∗ (ω′) , ω′) = xi (ω′) ,
for each ω′ ∈ Ω and for each i ∈ I.
Clearly, if the mechanism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
has a unique
maximin equilibrium, in which every player always tells the truth, then the
allocation x is implemented.
Definition 35. We say a strategy profile s is truth telling, if according to it,
every player reports the truth. That is, si
(
EGii
)
= EGii , for each E
Gi
i ∈ Gi,
and for each i. We denote such a strategy profile by sT .
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Indeed, under the truth telling strategy profile sT , we have,
gi
(
sT (ω) , ω
)
= gi
((
EG11 (ω) , . . . , E
GN
N (ω)
)
, ω
)
= ei (ω) +Di
(
x− e, (EG11 (ω) , . . . , EGNN (ω)))
= ei (ω) + xi (ω)− ei (ω) = xi (ω) ,
for each ω ∈ Ω and for each i ∈ I. So if sT is the only maximin equilibrium
of the mechanism Γ, the allocation x is implemented (Definition 34).
Definition 36. The players’ ex post utility functions are said to be private
information measurable, if for each i and for each fixed ci ∈ R`+, ui (ci; ·) is
Fi-measurable. That is, given any ci ∈ R`+, and any two states ω, ωˆ ∈ Ω,
with ω 6= ωˆ, we have ui (ci;ω) = ui (ci; ωˆ), whenever ω ∈ EFii (ωˆ).
This assumption is often assumed in games with incomplete information.
Indeed, one may regard, Fi as player i’s type space, and EFii ∈ Fi as a
possible type of player i. Then clearly, assuming the function ui (ci; ·) to be
Fi-measurable, is the same as assuming ui to depend on player i’s type.
Theorem 3. Denote by x the allocation of a partially revealing maximin ra-
tional expectations equilibrium (p, x) in an economy E with private informa-
tion measurable ex post utility functions. The mechanism Γ = 〈I, S, x− e,
{gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
has a truth telling maximin equilibrium sT , which is the
unique maximin equilibrium of the mechanism Γ ( i.e.,
{
sT
}
= ME (Γ) ), for
which we have gi
(
sT (ω) , ω
)
= xi (ω), for each ω ∈ Ω and for each i ∈ I,
i.e., the allocation x is implementable as a maximin equilibrium of its corre-
sponding mechanism Γ.
Proof. In Liu and Yannelis [25], we show that if the truth telling strategy
profile sT constitutes a maximin equilibrium, then it is the only maximin
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equilibrium5.
Here, we only need to show that sT is a maximin equilibrium of the mech-
anism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
. In what follows, we suppose sT is
not a maximin equilibrium, and conclude with a contradiction.
By Theorem 2, the allocation x is maximin Nash incentive compatible
(MNIC). Now, suppose that the mechanism Γ does not have a truth telling
maximin equilibrium. Then, there must exist a player i, an event EGii , and
a lie EˆGii ∈ Gi (clearly, EˆGii 6= EGii ), such that when the player observes the
event EGii , he can insure a better lower bound payoff by lying, i.e.,
min
E
G−i
−i ∈G−i;
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EGii , E
G−i
−i ;ω
′
)}
< min
E
G−i
−i ∈G−i;
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EˆGii , E
G−i
−i ;ω
′
)}
. (3.10)
To ease the explanation, denote the LHS of (3.10) by
vi
(
EGii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) := min
E
G−i
−i ∈G−i; ω′∈E
Gi
i
{
vi
(
EGii , E
G−i
−i ;ω
′
)}
,
where E∗−i ∈ G−i and ω∗ ∈ EGii solve the above minimization problem.
Case 1 We will show that if vi
(
EGii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) = ui (xi (ω∗) ;ω∗) and (3.10)
holds, then x fails to be MNIC.
5Recall, the implicit assumption here is that a player lies only if the lie makes him
strictly better off.
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Notice, vi
(
EGii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) = ui (xi (ω∗) ;ω∗) implies6 that
vi
(
EGii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) = min
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) ;ω′
)}
. (3.11)
Also, (3.10) implies7 that
vi
(
EGii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) < min
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EˆGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) ;ω′
)}
. (3.12)
Now, (3.11) and (3.12) together imply that
min
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EˆGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) ;ω′
)}
> min
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) ;ω′
)}
= min
ω′∈EGii
ui (xi (ω
′) ;ω′) . (3.13)
But if (3.13) holds, then x fails to be maximin Nash incentive compatible,
a contradiction.
Case 2 We will show that if vi
(
EGii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) 6= ui (xi (ω∗) ;ω∗), vi (EGii , E∗−i;
ω∗) 6= ui (ei (ω∗) ;ω∗), and (3.10) hold, then x fails to be maximin Nash in-
centive compatible.
Notice, vi
(
EGii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) 6= ui (xi (ω∗) ;ω∗) and vi (EGii , E∗−i;ω∗) 6= ui (ei (ω∗) ;
6Note ω∗ ∈ EGii , and
ui (xi (ω
∗) ;ω∗) = vi
(
EGii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗
)
:= min
E
G−i
−i ∈G−i;
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EGii , E
G−i
−i ;ω
′
)}
≤ min
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) ;ω′
)}
≤ vi
(
EGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
∗) ;ω∗
)
= ui (xi (ω
∗) ;ω∗) ,
imply that we must have equality throughout.
7Since by the definition of a minimum, we have
min
E
G−i
−i ∈G−i;
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EˆGii , E
G−i
−i ;ω
′
)}
≤ min
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EˆGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) ;ω′
)}
.
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ω∗) hold, only if EGii , E
∗
−i are compatible, and E
Gi
i ∩ E∗−i = {ωˆ} where ωˆ is
some state different from ω∗. This implies that we must have
vi
(
EGii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) = ui (ei (ω∗) + xi (ωˆ)− ei (ωˆ) ;ω∗) . (3.14)
Now since ωˆ, ω∗ ∈ EGii ⊆ EFii (ω∗), and both ei and ui are Fi-measurable.
We have
ui (ei (ω
∗) + xi (ωˆ)− ei (ωˆ) ;ω∗) = ui (xi (ωˆ) ;ω∗) = ui (xi (ωˆ) ; ωˆ) . (3.15)
Then (3.14) and (3.15) imply that
vi
(
EGii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) = min
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) ;ω′
)}
. (3.16)
Also, (3.10) implies that
vi
(
EGii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) < min
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EˆGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) ;ω′
)}
. (3.17)
Now, (3.16) and (3.17) together imply
min
ω′∈EGii
ui (xi (ω
′) ;ω′) = min
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) ;ω′
)}
< min
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EˆGii , E
G−i
−i (ω
′) ;ω′
)}
. (3.18)
But if (3.18) holds, then x fails to be maximin Nash incentive compatible, a
contradiction.
Case 3 Finally, we show that, if vi
(
EGii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) = ui (ei (ω∗) ;ω∗) 6=
ui (xi (ω
∗) ;ω∗), then (3.10) cannot hold.
Since (p, x) is partially revealing, there exists E
G−i
−i ∈ G−i, such that EˆGii ∩
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E
G−i
−i = ∅. Indeed, we know that p (ω′) = p (ω′′) for all ω′, ω′′ ∈ EˆGii . If
EˆGii ∩ EG−i−i 6= ∅ for every EG−i−i ∈ G−i, then we have p (ω′) = p (ω′′) for all
ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω. That is, (p, x) is a non-revealing MREE, which is a contradiction.
As a consequence, (3.10) cannot hold, since we cannot have
vi
(
EGii , E
∗
−i;ω
∗) = ui (ei (ω∗) ;ω∗)
< min
E
G−i
−i ∈G−i;
ω′∈EGii
{
vi
(
EˆGii , E
G−i
−i ;ω
′
)}
≤ ui (ei (ω∗) ;ω∗) . (3.19)
Now, we have considered all possible cases. We conclude that each partially
revealing MREE allocation is implementable.
Requiring the ex post utility functions to be private information measur-
able is essential8. If this condition fails, a partially revealing MREE may not
be implementable, as shown by the following example.
Example 6. There are two agents, I = {1, 2}, two goods, and
three states of nature Ω = {a, b, c}. The ex post utility function
of agent 1 is u1 (x1,1 (ω) , x1,2 (ω) ;ω) =
√
x1,1 (ω) · x1,2 (ω), ω ∈
{a, c}, and u1 (x1,1 (b) , x1,2 (b) ; b) = 2
√
x1,1 (b) · x1,2 (b), where
the second index refers to the good. The ex post utility func-
tion of agent 2 is u2 (x2,1 (ω) , x2,2 (ω) ;ω) =
√
x2,1 (ω) · x2,2 (ω),
ω ∈ Ω. The agents’ random initial endowments and information
partitions are:
8If the ex post utility functions are state independent, then they are automatically
private information measurable.
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(e1 (a) , e1 (b) , e1 (c)) = ((10, 10) , (10, 10) , (10, 8));
(e2 (a) , e2 (b) , e2 (c)) = ((8, 8) , (2, 10) , (8, 8));
F1 = {{a, b} , {c}}; F2 = {{a, c} , {b}}
This economy has a partially revealing MREE. The price p (a) =
p (b) = (1, 1), and p (c) =
(
16
18
, 1
)
. The allocation x is:
at state a, x1,1 (a) = 10, x1,2 (a) = 10, x2,1 (a) = 8, x2,2 (a) = 8;
at state b, x1,1 (b) = 6, x1,2 (b) = 14, x2,1 (b) = 6, x2,2 (b) = 6;
at state c, x1,1 (c) = 9.5, x1,2 (c) =
76
9
, x2,1 (c) = 8.5, x2,2 (c) =
68
9
.
Clearly, in this economy, player 1’s utility function is not private
information measurable. It turns out that the mechanism Γ =〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
has a unique maximin equilibrium,
in which player 1 always reports the event {c} and player 2 always
reports the true event. That is, s1 ({a, b}) = {c}, s1 ({c}) = {c},
s2 ({a}) = {a}, s2 ({b}) = {b}, and s2 ({c}) = {c} constitutes
the unique maximin equilibrium. Consequently, allocation y is
realized through the unique maximin equilibrium, in which
at state a, y1,1 (a) = 10, y1,2 (a) = 10, y2,1 (a) = 8, y2,2 (a) = 8;
at state b, y1,1 (b) = 10, y1,2 (b) = 10, y2,1 (b) = 2, y2,2 (b) = 10;
at state c, y1,1 (c) = 9.5, y1,2 (c) =
76
9
, y2,1 (c) = 8.5, y2,2 (c) =
68
9
.
Clearly, the allocation x fails to be implemented.
Interestingly, in Example 6, the less informed player lies. Indeed, upon
observing the event {a, b}, player 1 knows that the worst case is to carry out
the planned redistribution of the state b when the state is in fact a. To hedge
against this possibility, player 1 lies, i.e., he reports the event {c}.
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Yet, requiring the ex post utility functions to be private information mea-
surable is not necessary for implementing a partially revealing MREE. In
the following example, player 1’s utility function is not private information
measurable. The economy has a partially revealing MREE and it is imple-
mentable.
Example 7. There are two agents, I = {1, 2}, two goods, and
three states of nature Ω = {a, b, c}. The ex post utility function
of agent 1 is u1 (x1,1 (ω) , x1,2 (ω) ;ω) =
√
x1,1 (ω) · x1,2 (ω), ω ∈
{a, c}, and u1 (x1,1 (b) , x1,2 (b) ; b) = 2
√
x1,1 (b) · x1,2 (b), where
the second index refers to the good. The ex post utility func-
tion of agent 2 is u2 (x2,1 (ω) , x2,2 (ω) ;ω) =
√
x2,1 (ω) · x2,2 (ω),
ω ∈ Ω. The agents’ random initial endowments and information
partitions are:
(e1 (a) , e1 (b) , e1 (c)) = ((10, 6) , (10, 6) , (10, 20));
(e2 (a) , e2 (b) , e2 (c)) = ((4, 8) , (3, 7) , (4, 8));
F1 = {{a, b} , {c}}; F2 = {{a, c} , {b}}
This economy has a partially revealing MREE. The price p (a) =
p (b) = (1, 1), and p (c) = (2, 1). The allocation x is:
at state a, x1,1 (a) = 8, x1,2 (a) = 8, x2,1 (a) = 6, x2,2 (a) = 6;
at state b, x1,1 (b) = 8, x1,2 (b) = 8, x2,1 (b) = 5, x2,2 (b) = 5;
at state c, x1,1 (c) = 10, x1,2 (c) = 20, x2,1 (c) = 4, x2,2 (c) = 8.
The mechanism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
has a unique
maximin equilibrium, in which every agent tells the truth. That
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is, s1 ({a, b}) = {a, b}, s1 ({c}) = {c}, s2 ({a}) = {a}, s2 ({b}) =
{b}, and s2 ({c}) = {c} constitutes the unique maximin equilib-
rium. Consequently, the allocation x is implemented.
Unlike the partially revealing MREE, the fully revealing MREE alloca-
tions are always implementable, regardless of the form of the ex post utility
functions.
Theorem 4. Denote by x the allocation of a fully revealing maximin rational
expectations equilibrium (p, x). The mechanism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I ,
{ui}i∈I
〉
implements the allocation x as a maximin equilibrium.
Now, the players’ reports are singleton events. One can apply the proof
of Theorem 3 to show that Theorem 4 holds, expect now there are only two
cases, Case 1 and Case 3. The discussion for both cases go through without
relying on the private information measurability of the utility functions.
The non-revealing MREEs are harder to implement, in the sense that we
need to impose more condition on the economy to guarantee the implemen-
tation.
Definition 37. An economy E is lie detectable, if for every state ω and every
player i, when the player lies, it is possible that the players’ reports conflict.
That is, for every ω, every i and every lie EˆGii 6= EGii (ω), there exists EG−i−i ,
such that EˆGii ∩ EG−i−i = ∅.
Theorem 5. Denote by x the allocation of a non-revealing maximin ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium (p, x) in a lie detectable economy E with private
information measurable utility functions. The mechanism Γ = 〈I, S, x− e,
{gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
implements the allocation x as a maximin equilibrium.
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The proof of Theorem 3 can be used to show that Theorem 5 holds, ex-
pect under the Case 3, now the argument holds because the economy is lie
detectable. The conditions placed on the economy E are essential for Theo-
rem 5, in the sense that when these conditions fail, a non-revealing maximin
rational expectations equilibrium may not be implementable. The following
example clearly demonstrates it.
Example 8. There are two agents, I = {1, 2}, two goods, and
three states of nature Ω = {a, b, c}. The ex post utility function of
each agent i ∈ I is ui (xi,1 (ω) , xi,2 (ω) ;ω) =
√
xi,1 (ω) · xi,2 (ω),
ω ∈ {a, c}, and ui (xi,1 (b) , xi,2 (b) ; b) = 2
√
xi,1 (b) · xi,2 (b), where
the second index refers to the good. The agents’ random initial
endowments and information partitions are:
(e1 (a) , e1 (b) , e1 (c)) = ((10, 4) , (5, 2) , (5, 2));
(e2 (a) , e2 (b) , e2 (c)) = ((4, 8) , (4, 8) , (2, 4));
F1 = {{a} , {b, c}}; F2 = {{a, b} , {c}}
This economy has a non-revealing MREE. The price p (ω) =(
6
7
, 1
)
for each ω ∈ Ω and the allocation x is:
at state a, x1,1 (a) =
22
3
, x1,2 (a) =
44
7
, x2,1 (a) =
20
3
, x2,2 (a) =
40
7
;
at state b, x1,1 (b) = 4.5, x1,2 (b) =
17
7
, x2,1 (b) = 4.5, x2,2 (b) =
53
7
;
at state c, x1,1 (c) =
11
3
, x1,2 (c) =
22
7
, x2,1 (c) =
10
3
, x2,2 (c) =
20
7
.
Clearly, in this economy, the agents’ utility functions are not pri-
vate information measurable. Also, this economy is not lie de-
tectable. Indeed, when state a is realized, agent 1 can report
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{b, c} which is a lie, but agent 1’s report {b, c} intercepts with
agent 2’s report is never empty.
It turns out that the mechanism Γ =
〈
I, S, x− e, {gi}i∈I , {ui}i∈I
〉
has a unique maximin equilibrium, in which agent 1 always re-
ports the event {b, c} and agent 2 always reports the true event.
That is, s1 ({a}) = {b, c}, s1 ({b, c}) = {b, c}, s2 ({a, b}) = {a, b}
and s2 ({c}) = {c} constitutes the unique maximin equilibrium.
Consequently, allocation y is realized through the unique max-
imin equilibrium, in which
at state a, x1,1 (a) = 9.5, x1,2 (a) =
31
7
, x2,1 (a) = 4.5, x2,2 (a) =
53
7
;
at state b, x1,1 (b) = 4.5, x1,2 (b) =
17
7
, x2,1 (b) = 4.5, x2,2 (b) =
53
7
;
at state c, x1,1 (c) =
11
3
, x1,2 (c) =
22
7
, x2,1 (c) =
10
3
, x2,2 (c) =
20
7
.
Clearly, the allocation x fails to be implemented.
Remark 6. In fact, a non-revealing MREE allocation can be implementable,
even if the economy fails to be lie detectable, and the agents’ utility functions
fail to be Fi-measurable. That is, these conditions are not necessary. The
Kreps example neatly demonstrates this point.
Example 9. (Kreps) There are two agents, 1 and 2, two com-
modities, x and y, and two states of nature Ω = {ω1, ω2}. The
primitives of the economy are:
(e1 (ω1) , e1 (ω2)) = ((1.5, 1.5) , (1.5, 1.5)); F1 = {{ω1} , {ω2}}
(e2 (ω1) , e2 (ω2)) = ((1.5, 1.5) , (1.5, 1.5)); F2 = {{ω1, ω2}}.
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The utility functions of agent 1 and 2 in states ω1 and ω2 are
u1 (x1 (ω1) , y1 (ω1) ;ω1) = ln x1 (ω1) + y1 (ω1),
u1 (x1 (ω2) , y1 (ω2) ;ω2) = 2 lnx1 (ω2) + y1 (ω2);
u2 (x2 (ω1) , y2 (ω1) ;ω1) = 2 lnx2 (ω1) + y2 (ω1),
u2 (x2 (ω2) , y2 (ω2) ;ω2) = lnx2 (ω2) + y2 (ω2);
where x1 (ω1) denotes the quantity of the good x that agent 1
consumes at the state ω1, and y1 (ω1) denotes the quantity of the
good y that agent 1 consumes at the state ω1, etc. A MREE of
this economy consists of p (ω1) = p (ω2), and
(x1 (ω1) , y1 (ω1)) = (1, 2), (x1 (ω2) , y1 (ω2)) = (2, 1);
(x2 (ω1) , y2 (ω1)) = (2, 1), (x2 (ω2) , y2 (ω2)) = (1, 2).
Clearly, agent 2’s utility function is not F2-measurable. Also,
since the prices do not reveal any information, after observing
the prices, agent 2 still cannot distinguish the states ω1 and ω2.
That is, for agent 2, G2 = F2 = {{ω1, ω2}}.
But it can be easily checked that the MREE allocation x is im-
plementable. Indeed, agent 2 is uninformed in the interim, so he
cannot lie. Agent 1 is completely informed in the interim. So,
to satisfy the notion of implementation, we only need to check
agent 1’s incentive to lie. It turns out that agent 1 enjoys a
strictly higher payoff by being truthful: under the state ω1, agent
1 gets
v1 ({ω1} , {ω1, ω2} ;ω1) = u1 (x1 (ω1) , y1 (ω1) ;ω1) = ln 1 + 2 = 2
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by reporting truthfully (i.e., reports the event {ω1}), and gets
v1 ({ω2} , {ω1, ω2} ;ω1) = u1 (x1 (ω2) , y1 (ω2) ;ω1) = ln 2+1 = 1.69
by lying (i.e., reports the event {ω2}). Clearly, telling the truth
gives him a strictly higher interim payoff.
Similarly, under the state ω2, agent 1 gets v1 ({ω2} , {ω1, ω2} ;ω2) =
2.39 by reporting truthfully, and gets v1 ({ω1} , {ω1, ω2} ;ω2) = 2
by lying. Clearly, telling the truth is a better choice.
3.7 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we showed that each MREE allocation is maximin Nash
incentive compatible. That is, each agent prefers his MREE allocation to
any alternative allocation that he can get by lying, while perceiving others
as truthful.
Moreover, we show that each fully revealing MREE is implementable. That
is, given any arbitrary fully revealing MREE, there is a direct revelation
mechanism that yields the MREE allocation as its unique maximin equilib-
rium outcome. To guarantee the implementation of each partially revealing
MREE, we need the agents’ ex post utility functions to be private information
measurable. That is, we need the agents to know their utility functions in
the interim stage. However, we show that it is not a necessary condition for
implementing a partially revealing MREE. Finally, the non-revealing MREEs
are harder to implement, in the sense that we need to impose more condition
on the economy to guarantee the implementation, but these conditions are
not necessary.
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The limitation of the chapter is that, our mechanism depends on the
planned allocation. That is, we pick an allocation first, and then see how
to get it realized. We do not explain why the agents will agree upon that
allocation endogenously. It is of interest to examine if the agents are allowed
to propose an allocation from a set of candidates, what kind of allocations
can be implemented.
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